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In this essay I make use of the resources of ‘naturalized ontology’ in order to                             
determine what quantum mechanics implies about answers to fundamental                 
metaphysical questions. Naturalized ontology is a methodology for metaphysics                 
influenced by the philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine which makes explicit                     
reference to our best scientific theories in order to answer questions which have                         
traditionally been reckoned to belong solely to the realm of philosophy such as                         
‘What is the nature of reality in the most general sense?’ Quantum mechanics                         
faces a unique interpretational problem known as the ‘measurement problem’                   
which makes determining the answer to such general metaphysical questions                   
on this view especially problematic; nevertheless, naturalized ontology interprets                 
and evaluates the various responses to this problem via measures of                     






























































The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be                             




























Influenced by by W. V. Quine’s philosophy of science and metaphysics, the                       
methodology of naturalized ontology is one of looking at the best physical                       
theories available as a guide to fundamental metaphysical questioning.                 1
‘Naturalism’ according to Quine is “the recognition that it is within science itself,                         
and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described.”                           
(Quine 1981, p. 21) Because naturalism entails the “abandonment of … a first                         
philosophy prior to natural science” (Quine 1981, p. 67) it justifies itself from                         
within as the best available standpoint from which to seek knowledge: “we seek                         
no firmer basis for science than science itself [insofar as] we are free to use the                               
very fruits of science in investigating its roots.” (Quine 1995, p. 16) ‘Philosophy’                         
from a naturalistic standpoint is simply “natural science trained upon itself and                       
permitted free use of scientific findings.” (Quine 1981, p. 85) Since quantum                       
mechanics is arguably the current exemplar of a scientific theory, then laying my                         
cards on the table at the earliest available opportunity, I want to make it clear                             
that the guiding question of naturalized ontology will be:  
 
What does quantum mechanics (as our best physical theory) say about                     
the nature of reality in the most general sense?  
 
Naturalized ontology means assuming outright ​that quantum mechanics               
corresponds to reality in some way in order to see what metaphysical                       
implications follow. What this means in practise is assuming that quantum                     
mechanics tracks the state of the world in a truthful way. This means                         
that—initially at least—we will not be considering interpretations of quantum                   
1 Because naturalized ontology means looking at our best physics, what this entails in practice a lot                                 
of the time is looking at the​most up­to­date physics, so in this thesis I will endeavour to refer to the                                         
most recent research and developments in the (philosophy of) physics literature, at least as far as I                                 
am aware of it. 
6 
mechanics which treat it merely instrumentally, for example Born’s statistical                   
interpretation which interprets the quantum wave function epistemically—rather               
than ontologically—as a tool for calculating the probabilities for measurement                   
outcomes in quantum experiments.  2
 
Working out what quantum mechanics says about the nature of reality in this                         
sense partly entails providing a specific explanatory account of the connection                     
between, to use Wilfrid Sellars’s terms, the ‘scientific’ image of nature provided                       
by quantum mechanics and the ‘manifest’ image of everyday experience                   
(Sellars 1962). As an example of how such an enterprise proceeds, consider                       
another paradigm where giving such an account is relatively intuitive and                     
straightforward: classical mechanics. In this theory the scientific image of the                     
world is given by a ‘primitive ontology’ (Allori 2013) whose variables range over                         
microscopic material particles; the manifest image of everyday objects such as                     
chairs, cats, and stars then reduces to the histories of these primitive variables                         
at some macroscopic limit (Allori 2013, pp. 67­68).  
 
Unfortunately, things aren’t quite so clear­cut in the case of quantum mechanics                       
where, despite its being one of the most accurate, explanatorily powerful, and                       
well­verified (in a word: successful) physical theories ever discovered , and                   3
furthermore being roughly a century old, there is ​still major disagreement over                       
foundational issues. This is partly because it is not at all clear what quantum                           
mechanics is really ​about​, due to disagreement between physicists and                   
philosophers regarding fundamental meta­physical issues. As an informal               
presentation of this state of affairs, consider the following: at a conference on                         
the foundations of quantum mechanics called ‘Quantum Physics and the Nature                     
2 For what it’s worth, this assumption should not be mistaken for a genuinely­held belief on the part                                   
of the author about quantum mechanics’s correspondence with reality, either (that is, the author is                             
not necessarily a ‘true believer’ in quantum mechanics, as will become apparent). 
3 Non­classical phenomena quantum mechanics was developed in order to explain include                       
black­body radiation, the photoelectric effect, and electron diffraction, among others. 
7 
of Reality’ held in July 2011, a poll was taken, and the results were                           
subsequently written up in a paper. Note that there were only 33 respondents                         4
to the poll among those who attended the conference, so it should not be                           
considered a definitive survey by any means; nevertheless, it suggests a decent                       
snapshot of the current situation regarding quantum foundations. Tellingly, for                   
our purposes, is the fact that one of the questions on the poll was ‘What is your                                 
favourite interpretation of quantum mechanics?’ ‘​Favourite interpretation’​? Such               
subjective­seeming concepts surely cannot be relevant to physics, since physics                   
is meant to be as objective a science you can imagine. What is meant by these                               
worrying terms in this context? The short answer is that, if quantum mechanics                         
is taken to represent reality, then it is not at all clear what this could possibly                               
mean, due to the fact that the mathematical structure of the theory does not                           
suggest a definitive, clear­cut explanation of what the world world​must be like in                           
order for it to be so successful. This is because quantum mechanics has a                           
number of empirically indistinguishable yet ontologically divergent             5
‘interpretations’, each of which was developed in response to a problem known                       
as the ‘measurement problem’ which is, in the words of Sheldon Goldstein, “​the                         
conceptual difficulty” (Goldstein 2013, emphasis original) afflicting quantum               
mechanics. 
 
The measurement problem essentially arises due a proposition about quantum                   
mechanics we assumed at the start of this essay: that it represents reality. In                           
practice what this entails is that it should be interpreted realistically as a theory                           
about the nature and behaviour of an entity known as the ‘wave function’.                         
Understood in this way, the measurement problem is a paradox about the                       
connection between what quantum mechanics predicts when the wave function                   
is taken to represent the complete reality of physical systems and what is                         




(Wallace 2013, p. 7). The problem is that the dynamical law guiding the                         
behaviour of the wave function and which arguably explains the aforementioned                     
non­classical phenomena quantum mechanics was developed in response to                 
also entails that the wave function evolves into physical states that are in direct                           
conflict with what is experienced. Alyssa Ney provides a succinct diagnosis of                       
the problem: 
 
“The trouble is that what the laws of quantum mechanics predict is very                         
strange and … appears to be in conflict with what we actually observe                         
when we take measurements” (Ney 2013a, p. 24).  
 
It is thus the measurement problem which gives rise to the infamous                       
foundational enterprise of ‘interpreting’ quantum mechanics: each class of                 
solutions to the measurement problem—and there are a few!—is roughly                   
considered to be its own, mutually­exclusive ‘interpretation’ of quantum                 
mechanics, hence why the attendees at the conference on quantum foundations                     
were polled on their ‘favourite interpretation’.  6
 
As Craig Callender (2009) points out, any realistic solution to the measurement                       
problem will come with its own background metaphysical assumptions, including                   
a distinct set of ontological commitments, the nature and dynamics of which will                         
in turn imply answers to long­standing metaphysical questions regarding, for                   
example, the problem of determinism and free will, the nature of space and                         
time, the connection between mind and world, among other things. This being                       
the case, it is perhaps more accurate to say that each solution to the                           
measurement problem—insofar as each is, roughly speaking, committed to a                   
different ontology and different laws specifying how this ontology evolves                   
6 Interestingly, 58% of physicists surveyed at the same conference responded to the question                           
“How much is the choice of interpretation a matter of personal philosophical prejudice?” with the                             
answer “A lot” while 27% of them responded with the answer “A little” (Schlosshauer, Kofler,                             
Zeilinger 2013, p. 9). 
9 
dynamically in time, and so on—will itself suggest a more general background                       
fundamental metaphysical ‘interpretation’ about the nature of reality as a whole                     
in general, rather than merely quantum mechanics in particular.  7
 
So insofar as we are assuming quantum mechanics represents the nature of                       
reality in order to figure out what metaphysical implications follow, and because                       
each interpretation of quantum mechanics comes with its own distinct set of                       
metaphysical ‘baggage’ (Tegmark 2008), this means that, in order to see what                       
picture of reality follows from quantum mechanics, we are compelled to address                       
the measurement problem, and determine the best way to deal with it. As Ney                           
puts it:  
 
“Anyone who wants to understand quantum mechanics as a theory of our                       
world (i.e. anyone who wants to be a realist about this theory) … must do                             





Before moving on, I first want to address an oft­cited misconception about                       
quantum mechanics which is that its different interpretations—despite the fact                   
that such approaches entail drastically different pictures of reality as a whole,                       
completely ontologically at odds with eachother—are experimentally             
indistinguishable from one another and that quantum mechanics is therefore                   
underdetermined by empirical evidence as a consequence. This common                 
misconception is nicely summed up by Holger Lyre when he states that the                         
various interpretations of quantum mechanics are “empirically equivalent, but                 
ontologically different.” ​(Lyre 2010, p. 1432) That is, according to Lyre, quantum                       
7 In other words: arguably the ‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics are distinct meta­physical                         
theories which come with their own sets of assumptions and prejudices about the connections                           
between theory and experience and indeed about the nature of reality as a whole. 
10 
mechanics is underdetermined owing to the supposed fact that each of its                       
interpretations entail the same corpus of empirical data. This state of affairs (as                         
he sees it) leads Lyre to posit the following principle about quantum mechanics: 
 
“Call this QTUD: the underdetermination of quantum theory by empirical                   
evidence as displayed in the multitude of rivaling interpretations.” (Lyre                   
2010, p. 1434) 
 
Lyre cites this as a particular example of what he calls more generally the                           
‘thesis of theory underdetermination’: 
 
“TUD­Thesis: ​For any theory T and any body of observation O there                       
exists another theory T’, such that T and T’ are empirically equivalent (but                         
ontologically different).” (Lyre 2010, p. 1433) 
 
Regarding this “multitude of rivalling interpretations”, Lyre cannot envision ​any                   
future empirical evidence being brought to bear in deciding between them, as                       
his TUD­Thesis considers underdetermination of theory by evidence even in the                     
context of “​all possible (past and future) observations.” (Lyre 2010, p. 1433,                       
emphasis added) Although Lyre is correct in pointing out that the interpretations                       
of quantum mechanics entails “heterogeneous ontological pictures of the world”                   
(Lyre 2010, p. 1432), he is nevertheless emphatically incorrect in his claim that                         
the all of these interpretations are empirically underdetermined in the case of​all                         
future data. The most clear example of this—an example which we will address                         
in much more detail in a later section—concerns ‘collapse’ theories which are                       
actually empirically ​inequivalent to other quantum interpretations insofar as they                   
do not in fact “satisfy the same corpus of observational data” (Lyre 2010, p.                           
1432) as them. For example, dynamical collapse theories make clear empirical                     
predictions which can—in principle at least if not always in practice given the                         
limitations of current technology—be put to the test, specifically predictions                   
11 
regarding whether states of quantum superposition can persist past some                   
macroscopic limit. Indeed, according to the physicist Giancarlo Ghirardi: 
 
“Collapse theories qualify themselves as rival theories of quantum                 
mechanics and one can easily identify some of their physical implications                     
which, in principle, would allow crucial tests discriminating between the                   
two.” (Ghirardi 2011) 
 
Now, although it is clear that Lyre’s QTUD principle—the misconception about                     
all the interpretations of quantum mechanics being empirically underdetermined                 
in the case of ​all future data—is misguided, at the same time this is not to deny                                 
that there are interpretations of quantum mechanics which ​are ​in fact                     
empirically­indistinguishable from one another. For example hidden variables               
theories and no­collapse theories are indistinguishable in the sense that they                     
entail the same corpus of empirical data, insofar as there is no experiment one                           
could perform that would constitute evidence for one over and above the other.                         
For naturalized ontology, then, in cases where there is no such experimental                       
data available to decide between them, theories are evaluated via                   
supra­empirical measures of theoretical virtue, specifically parsimony and               
explanatory power. 
 
Taking all this into account, then, the modus operandi of naturalized ontology                       
becomes: if you want to work out the nature of reality in a general sense, then                               
you had better first work out what the best way to conceive of the connection                             
between theory (scientific image) and experience (manifest image) on the                   
quantum mechanical picture is. In essence this means directly addressing the                     
measurement problem and evaluating the responses to it, in accordance with                     
uncontroversial, objective criteria of theoretical virtue, summed up in the                   





Before we move on to examining and evaluating the competing interpretations                     
of quantum mechanics we will first examine how it was developed in its (rough)                           
historical context, specifically with regard to how the course of this development                       
lead physicists and philosophers straight to the measurement problem.  
 
In order to clearly illustrate the novel conceptual features of quantum                     
mechanics, i.e. those features which render it seemingly anomalous from the                     
perspective of the previously prevailing paradigm of classical mechanics, we will                     
examine two phenomena which seemingly necessitate a non­classical               





To begin with, the ability of quantum systems to exhibit the phenomenon of                         
‘interference’ arguably cannot be understood if they are thought of as being                       
made up of discrete entities which exist in definite classical states. Quantum                       
interference is perhaps most vividly demonstrated in the infamous double­slit                   
experiment. In this experiment light is shined toward a screen with two vertical                         10
slits cut into it onto a photographic plate behind. The light projects alternating                         
dark and bright bands onto the plate: an interference pattern. Thomas Young,                       
who first ran the experiment in the 19th century, explained this interference                       
8 According to Richard Feynman, quantum interference is “a phenomenon which is impossible,                         
absolutely impossible, to explain in any classical way, and which has in it the heart of quantum                                 
mechanics. In reality it contains the only mystery.” (Feynman 1963, p. 37) 
9 “I would not call [entanglement] one but rather ​the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the                               
one that enforces its entire departure from classical lines of thought.” (Schrodinger 1935, p. 555) 
10 For Ghirardi it is “interference experiments [that] verify quantum mechanics” (Ghirardi 2011)​per                           
se​. 
13 
pattern by postulating that light is a wave and stating that the two slits on the                               
screen cause the light waves to overlap and their amplitudes to interfere as they                           
pass through them: bright bands correspond to crest­crest interference where                   
the amplitudes of the wave are reinforcing eachother whereas dark bands                     
correspond to crest­trough interference where the amplitudes are cancelling                 
eachother out. In 1905, however, Albert Einstein’s demonstration of the                   
photoelectric effect (the ability of photons to bump into electrons and knock                       
them out of their shells i.e. where they orbit around the nucleus of an atom)                             
proved that light comes in discrete—or quantized —packets (particles) called                 11
photons. This fact suggested a variant of the double­slit experiment where the                       
light could be sent through the slits a single packet of light at a time. ​This was                                 
realized in 1909, when a physicist named Geoffrey Taylor ran the double­slit                       
experiment with individual photons and recorded, dot­by­dot, where each of                   
them landed on the photographic plate behind the screen. Taylor found that                       
over time the same interference pattern of alternating bright and dark bands was                         
projected onto the photographic plate: the smoking gun for wave—not                   
particle—behaviour. This result completely baffled contemporary physicists             
because it was contrary to their classical expectations, which dictated that the                       
discrete photons would follow definite trajectories through either of the slits to                       
the exclusion of the other and deposit on the photographic plate over time as                           
two narrow bands of light directly opposite each slit. 
 
Nevertheless, the textbook explanation of the interference pattern appearing in                   
the case of the version of the double­slit experiment performed with discrete                       
photons which came to be accepted by quantum physicists is that, since there is                           
nothing else for the single photons to interfere with, then they must actually be                           
travelling through both slits at the same time and interfering with ​themselves​.                       
That is, the observed interference patterns suggest that each single photon                     
11 Hence ‘quantum’ mechanics. 
14 
follows multiple trajectories from the coherent light source, travels through both                     
slits which causes them to interfere with themselves like waves do, and finally                         
lands on the photographic plate, causing the familiar interference patterns as                     
evidence of this. In these contexts, it doesn’t make sense to ask which slit the                             
photon ‘really’ went through because interference seems to suggest that the                     
photon does not go through ​either the left slit ​or the right slit to the exclusion of                                 
the other, as would a classical particle following a definite trajectory, but rather                         
goes through ​both the left slit ​and the right slit ​at the same time​, like a wave, or                                   
in Quantumese follows a ‘superposition’ of trajectories: 
 
“Most experiments aiming to verify that a particle is in a quantum                       
superposition of states look for evidence of interference.” (Knee 2015) 
 
Interference is thus a specific example of the phenomenon of quantum                     
superposition. Superposition more generally refers to the ability of quantum                   
systems such as photons to do multiple, even contradictory things at once, for                         
example, occupy two different positions simultaneously or even move and stay                     
stationary at the same time. It is important to note that superpositions aren’t just                           
confined to e.g. position and momentum states; in quantum mechanics many                     
physical variables—not just position—can take on combinations of values. For                   
example quantum entities can also be in superpositions of energy levels, ‘spin’                       
states, and so on. Superposition states thus forced early quantum physicists to                       
come up with a novel way of representing quantum entities because                     








Entanglement is a phenomenon first described by the physicist Erwin                   
Schrodinger in 1926. ​In a later paper, Schrodinger describes entanglement in                     
the following way: 
 
“When two systems, of which we know the states by their respective                       
representatives, enter into temporary physical interaction due to known                 
forces between them, and when after a time of mutual influence the                       
systems separate again, then they can no longer be described in the                       
same way as before, viz. by endowing each of them with a representative                         
of its own. … By the interaction the two representatives have become                       
entangled.”  (Schrodinger 1935, p. 555) 
 
Entanglement is a form of strong nonclassical correlation between spatially                   
separated quantum systems which emerges under certain circumstances when                 
distinct physical systems (such as two particles or even a particle and its                         
environment) interact, and which persists even when these systems are                   
separated in space. Entanglement is distinguished from mere classical                 
correlation due to the fact that entangled entities are strongly correlated in a                         
superposition of ways, such that the behaviour of the unified system is no longer                           
describable classically, e.g. in terms of the interactions between definite                   
particles with their own individual identities. Thus, in mathematical terms, for                     
entangled physical systems, the “states of [the] composite system … cannot be                       
expressed as direct products of quantum states of the individual components.”                     
(Shimony 2009) There is more information contained within state of the unified,                       
entangled physical system than in the conjunction of the components which                     
make it up. In other words, when entities become entangled, the correlation                       









is the entity used to represent quantum entities insofar as wave functions                       
explicitly represent superposition and entanglement states. The reason wave                 12
functions represent superposition states is because they are essentially                 
distributions of complex­valued ‘amplitudes’ over a state space called                 
‘configuration space’, where each amplitude assigned to a point in configuration                     
space corresponds to a distinct possible configuration a physical system can be                       
in. ​Interference in quantum experiments is accounted for by the ‘interference                     
term’ of the wave function which is a “phase relation” (Bacciagaluppi 2012)                       
which links the distinct terms of the wave function in order to account for the                             
interference between them (Bacciagaluppi 2012). Likewise, the reason               
entangled states must be represented by the wave function is because—to put it                         
crudely—an entangled system is more than the sum of its parts, and as a                           
consequence of this: 
 
“[I]t is argued that entangled states cannot be adequately characterized                   
in terms of states of entities living in familiar, three­dimensional space;                     
rather, they must be characterized as states of something—namely, the                   
wave function—spread out across a higher­dimensional (configuration)             
space” (French 2013, p. 78). 
 
12 Yet note that it is not just the phenomena of superposition and entanglement that imply a wave                                   
function representation for quantum entities. For example according to Valia Allori, “results … such                           
as Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle … were taken to show that quantum theories had to be about                               
the wave function, not about particles.” (Allori 2013, p. 67) 
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That is, the components of a strongly­correlated, interacting (i.e. entangled)                   
quantum state are interwoven and inextricable, and share a unified wave                     
function, which “combines—or binds—[them] into a single irreducible reality.”                 
(Goldstein 2013) 
 






which is the law governing the evolution of the wave function over time. The                           
future state of a quantum system is calculated by plugging the Hamiltonian of its                           
wave function (​which represents its total energy at a point in time) into the                           
Schrodinger equation; the solution to this equation outputs the state of the                       
system in the future (Adler and Bassi 2009, p. 1)​. ​In order to account for                             
superposition states such as interference effects ​the Schrodinger dynamics are                   
‘linear’ ​(Barrett 2014)​, which means that, given multiple solutions to the                     
equation, then any sum of those solutions is itself a solution. Indeed, according                         
to Simon Saunders, linearity is also known as the ‘superposition principle’,                     












OK, so far so good. Due to entanglement and interference, almost no­one has a                           
problem with the idea that physical systems must—in some contexts, at                     
least—be represented by the wave function evolving according to the linear                     
dynamics, as opposed to some classical state evolving according to classical                     
laws. ​However, there is a major problem associated with taking the wave                       13
function to fully represent the reality of such systems insofar as the linearity of                           
the Schrodinger equation determining the wave function’s dynamics entail that it                     
evolves into states that are inconsistent with experience; this is because                     
linearity ensures that terms in superposition states can never “drop away” (Ney                       
2013a, p. 21). Ney elaborates: 
 
“[D]ue to the linearity of the Schrödinger equation, systems in                   
superpositions of (say) position never evolve out of these                 
superpositions—what corresponds to terms in the sum do not go away.”                     
(Ney 2013a, p. 30)  
 
This being the case, then the linear dynamics entail that the states of physical                           
systems should ​always be described by superpositions, which is a problem                     
because such states are never directly observed: 
 
“[W]e never observe systems in a smeared­out state of being here and                       
there or observe a pointer in a superposition of pointing here and there.”                         
(Ney 2013a, p. 30) 
 
Although the linear Schrodinger evolution entails superposition is always                 
preserved and thus that physical systems systems should always be described                     
13 The key word here being ‘almost’. There are interpretations of quantum mechanics known as                             
‘hidden variables theories’ which resist this idea. We will discuss the most prominent of these                             
theories in a later section. 
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in terms of coherent superpositions, nevertheless these systems are only ever                     
observed to be in definite states when measurements are performed on them                       
(Ney 2013a, p. 24). The measurement problem is thus the problem of                       
reconciling quantum theory’s invocation of the linear Schrodinger dynamics                 
needed to account for superposition and always predicting this superposition                   
with the appearance of the definite reality actually experienced when quantum                     
systems are measured (Callender 2009). 
 
To bring it back to the double­slit experiment: in this context, the measurement                         
problem is the problem of accounting for why, if interference suggests that                       
quantum entities move through a superposition of all possible trajectories, and if                       
linearity entails that these entities cannot evolve out of their superposition                     
states, such entities nevertheless appear to exist in definite states when                     
measurements are performed on them. This apparent breakdown of the                   
Schrodinger dynamics is most easily demonstrated if you place a measuring                     
device at the slits in the double­slit experiment set up in order to try and                             
measure which slit the photon ‘really’ travels through. In this context linearity                       
seemingly breaks down and wave functions, rather than describing                 
superpositions, seem to ‘collapse’ onto definite states instead.  
 
This version of the double­slit experiment is described by a wave function for a                           
physical system composed of a measuring device ‘device’ and a photon                     
‘photon’. Initially, device is set up so that it measures the state of photon;                           
photon’s state is ‘left’ if it will travel through the left slit, and ‘right’ if it will travel                                   
through the right slit. There is an observable on device known as its ‘pointer                           
state’; the value of this variable before measurement is ‘ready’ (also referred to                         
















The rules of interaction between device and photon are as follows: if, before                         
measurement, photon is in its ‘left’ state, then after measurement device’s                     






These rules capture just what a measurement is: device is measuring the state                         
of photon just if there is some observable on device which reliably tracks the                           
state of photon in an appropriate way (Ismael 2009). 
 
If measuring devices are themselves considered to be subject to the linear                       
Schrodinger dynamics then the rules for linear Schrodinger evolution (i.e. the                     14
fact that linearity “preserves superpositions” (Ghirardi 2011)) tell us that the joint                       
state of photon and device after interaction is a superposition of states of the the                             
unified system (Ismael 2009). That is, if device measures photon, it follows from                         
14 A plausible assumption if you consider that the measuring device is ultimately made of                             
elementary particles (electrons etc.) which themselves obey the laws of quantum mechanics. 
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the linear dynamics and the rules of interaction between device and photon if                         





Basically, if photon is in a superposition of different states, then, since linearity                         
means that superpositions are preserved, device should be sensitive to this and                       
register both measurement outcomes. The interaction between device and                 
photon should thus lead to a final state where device is in a linear superposition                             
of registering multiple states of photon. However nobody has ever actually                     









If the wave function describes a superposition of going through both slits at the                           
same time, and if the terms in this superposition are prevented from                       
disappearing because of the linearity of the Schrodinger equation, then the                     
measuring device should register a superposition of states:​both the state where                       
the photon travelled through the left slit, ​and the state where the photon                         
travelled through the right slit. Yet the meaning of such a state of affairs isn’t                             
clear because the measuring device always registers definite measurement                 
outcomes instead: ​either the state where the photon travelled through the left                       
slit, ​or the state where the photon travelled through the right slit. That is, only                             
one term in the superposition (corresponding to a definite outcome) is ever                       
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observed (Byrne 2010). What this problem corresponds to mathematically is the                     
fact that, in situations which are characteristic of measurement, the interference                     
term in the wave function is no longer needed to build the correct wave function                             
for the physical system under observation; in these contexts some “classical                     
probability formula” (Bacciagaluppi 2012) predicts the observed outcome               
instead. So understood in this way the measurement problem is essentially the                       
problem of accounting for why quantum theory’s linear dynamics which preserve                     
superpositions break down in contexts that are characteristic of measurement.  
 
To hone in on the problem a little bit: it is in fact the conjunction of the                                 
assumptions of the ‘representational completeness of the wave function’ and                   
‘linearity in all contexts’ that together predict something about the final state of                         
physical systems that is seemingly inconsistent with what is actually                   
experienced insofar as such systems appear to be in a definite (classical) states                         
rather than superposed ones when they are observed (Bub and Pitowsky 2010,                       





As an attempt to solve the measurement problem, the physicist John von                       
Neumann took the strategy of denying the second assumption i.e. ‘linearity in all                         
contexts’; to that end he modified the quantum laws so that the linear                         
Schrodinger dynamics aren’t determining the evolution of physical systems in                   
contexts that are characteristic of measurement. Inspired by the thought that if it                         
is possible (even in principle) for an observer to determine which slit the photon                           
passes through, then the interference pattern disappears (Goldstein 2013), or in                     
other words the idea that quantum entities seemingly only exist in superposition                       
states when nothing is observing them, von Neumann was led to the idea that                           
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consciousness plays a central role in quantum mechanics insofar as the act of                         
measurement by a conscious observer apparently marks the point where                   
linearity breaks down and wave functions ‘collapse’ from superposition states                   
onto definite outcomes. 
 
This supposed ‘solution’ to the measurement problem is part of von Neumann’s                       
‘orthodox quantum mechanics’ which is his rigorous mathematical               
axiomatization of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg’s earlier ‘Copenhagen’                 
interpretation. According to orthodox quantum mechanics, there are two laws                   
which describe the evolution of the wave function that apply in different                       
contexts: when a system is being observed it evolves according to the ‘collapse                         
postulate’ (Process 1) into a sharp peak in amplitude localized around a definite                         
measurement outcome via an indeterministic or ‘stochastic’ process; when a                   
system isn’t being observed it evolves according to the Schrodinger equation                     
(Process 2) and behaves in the standard quantum way (i.e. as a linear or                           
coherent process).  
 
On this interpretation, collapse accounts for the manifest image that we all                       
experience insofar as it marks the point of the ‘classical limit’ i.e. the point at                             
which the quantum (superposed) world transitions into the classical (definite)                   
one. 
 
A major criticism of orthodox quantum mechanics is that it seems to entail that                           
physical systems possess full reality only insofar as they are observed. Yet for                         15
many physicists and philosophers—insofar as they are ontological               
physicalists​—it is absolutely unacceptable for consciousness or any other                 
dualistic concept to play this sort of role in a fundamental physical theory. More                           
generally, the idea that subjective concepts such as measurement, observation,                   
15 As Einstein famously complained to Niels Bohr: “​"Do you really believe the moon exists only                               
when you look at it?” 
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or consciousness can affect the evolution of the physical wave function in this                         
way is completely mysterious and therefore suspect; for example, observation                   
arguably cannot be a fundamental notion in a physical theory because                     
observers are obviously not fundamental physical entities themselves.               16
Similarly Chris Timpson argues that the principles of physicalism and realism                     
should make us wary about introducing ‘measurement’ as a primitive concept in                       
a fundamental physical theory: measuring devices are themselves made up of                     
particles, and so should be treated as obeying the same dynamical laws as                         
other physical interactions (Timpson 2010, p. 464). Furthermore, von                 17
Neumann never quantitatively specifies exactly when a measurement (his                 
Process 1) is happening: there is thus a problem about determining exactly                       
when linearity breaks down on his theory. Thus von Neumann’s collapse                     





Taking criticisms of orthodox quantum mechanics such as the aforementioned                   
on board—i.e. that it doesn’t suggest a dynamical mechanism which has a basis                         
in precise physical laws which could possibly provide a non­arbitrary                   
explanation for why the breakdown of linearity occurs (Ghirardi 2011)—so­called                   
‘dynamical collapse’ theories modify the Schrodinger dynamics, making collapse                 
a “natural mechanism” (Ney 2013a, p. 35) caused via, for example, interaction                       
between micro­ and macro­systems, rather than via ‘measurement’ which is an                     
inappropriate notion for a fundamental physical theory (Ney 2013a, p. 35).   
16 A related objection concerns the fact that in orthodox quantum mechanics observers are always                             
treated as external to the physical system under inspection; this has the consequence that                           





The most well known of these dynamical collapse theories was formulated in                       
1986 by the physicists Giancarlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini, and Tullio Weber                     
(GRW). GRW didn’t locate a sharp, distinct boundary between where collapse                     
occurs and where it doesn’t; rather they modified the Schrodinger equation “by                       
the addition of stochastic and nonlinear terms” (Ghirardi 2011) in a way such                         
that it applies to all physical systems at all times and yet is also able to account                                 
for collapse as an explicitly dynamical, mathematically­precise process. This                 
modification of the quantum dynamics has the consequence that, for all                     
situations except ones that would be characteristic of measuring a physical                     
system such as a measuring device in a state of superposition, the modified                         
equation gives identical results to the unmodified Schrodinger equation.                 
However the predictions of GRW’s modified equation depart drastically from the                     
predictions of the Schrodinger equation in situations where one is dealing with a                         
physical system such as a measuring device that is predicted by the unmodified                         
Schrodinger dynamics to be in a state of superposition (Wallace 2013, pp. 7­8);                         
in those situations GRW’s stochastic modification of the Schrodinger equation                   
guarantees that the predicted superposition breaks down via a stochastic                   
process of collapse onto peaks in amplitude localized around the observed,                     
definite measurement outcome (Ney 2013b, pp. 170­171). This modification is                   18
necessary, in GRW’s view, because if the wave function of a physical system                         
such as a measuring device is to provide an accurate description of that system                           
post­measurement, then it had better correspond to the observed (definite)                   
outcome, rather than a superposition of outcomes. As Bacciagaluppi puts it, the                       
strategy of dynamical collapse theories such as GRW’s is “to modify the                       
Schrödinger equation, so that superpositions of different ‘everyday’ states do                   
not arise or are very unstable.” (Bacciagaluppi 2012) Hence, according to                     
18 cf. Allori 2013, p. 69 
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Ghirardi, GRW’s dynamics guarantee that the quantum wave function will                   
always accurately describe all physical systems  at all times: 19
 
“The nice fact is that the resulting theory is capable, on the basis of a                             
single dynamics which is assumed to govern all natural processes, to                     
account at the same time for all well­established facts about microscopic                     
systems as described by the standard theory as well as for the so­called                         
postulate of wave packet reduction (WPR).” (Ghirardi 2011) 
 
To bring it back to the double­slit experiment, GRW ensures that there is no                           
measurement problem in this context, because the laws of the theory entail that                         
“a superposition of ‘a counter which has fired’ and ‘one which has not fired’ is                             
dynamically forbidden.” (Ghirardi 2011) 
 
Crucially, concepts such as measurement, observation, consciousness, and so                 
on are not playing a fundamental role in the formulation of the theory (as they                             
were in orthodox quantum mechanics)—definite measurement outcomes are               
derived from the physical dynamics alone. According to GRW’s theory,                   
individual quantum entities really do exist in superposition states which rarely                     
collapse; however collections of these entities tend to reach some ‘classical                     
limit’, spike in amplitude, and then rapidly collapse via a process of                       
‘spontaneous localization’ onto localized states “of the form used to describe                     
approximate position measurements.” (Bacciagaluppi 2012) On this theory “the                 
overall frequency for collapse is … tied to mass density” (Bacciagaluppi 2012)                       
or in other words a physical system’s size or complexity. More specifically: the                         
“spontaneous localization mechanism is enhanced by increasing the number of                   
particles” (Ghirardi 2011) due to the “trigger mechanism” (Ghirardi 2011) known                     
as ‘hitting’ which is enhanced—referring to the relative effectivity of collapse                     
mechanism going from the micro­ to the macro­level—when there are more                     
19 Indeed, according to GRW’s “ontologically monistic theory” (Maudlin 2010, p. 122) the wave                           
function representation constitutes a “complete description of reality” (Ney 2013a, p. 34). 
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particles because the “hitting frequency is … effectively amplified proportionally                   
to the number of constituents.” (Ghirardi 2011) So when the state of a single                           
particle is spontaneously localized, a multiplicative ‘hitting’ process often leads                   
to the suppression of macroscopic superposition because “if any of the particles                       
… undergoes a hitting process … the multiplication prescription leads practically                     
to the suppression” (Ghirardi 2011) of other terms in superposed wave functions                       
not describing the observed measurement outcome. In summary: when there                   
are a large number of particles “any spontaneous localization of any of the                         
constituents amounts to a localization of the [entire system]” (Ghirardi 2011)                     
insofar as the ‘hittings’ invariably amplify to a large number of constituents of the                           
physical system. Thus, although the probability for a single, constituent particle                     
of a physical system to spontaneously collapse is extremely low (securing                     
standard quantum behaviour), by the time you get to physical systems the size                         
of, say, measuring devices, the probability for at least one of their constituents                         
to collapse and ground a definite reality for the overall system through the                         
‘hitting’ process is extremely high.  20
 
According to Ghirardi “the mass density at any point, directly identified by the                         
[wave function] … is the appropriate quantity on which to base an appropriate                         
ontology” (Ghirardi 2011) for this theory. Ghirardi refers to this view as the ‘mass                           
density ontology’: 
 
“Accordingly … what the theory is about, what is real ‘out there’ at a                           
given space point x, is just a field, i.e., a variable m(x,t) given by the                             
expectation value of the mass density operator M(x) at x obtained by                       
multiplying the mass of any kind of particle times the number density                       
operator for the considered type of particle and summing over all possible                       
types of particles which can be present….[I]f one considers only the                     
states allowed by the dynamics one can give a description of the world in                           
terms of m(x,t), i.e., one recovers a physically meaningful account of                     
20 “[A] microscopic system undergoes a localization, on average, every hundred million years, while                           
a macroscopic one undergoes a localization every 10−7 seconds.” (Ghirardi 2011) 
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physical reality in the usual 3­dimensional space and time.” (Ghirardi                   
2011) 
 
Thus the manifest image is secured via identifying the continuous distribution of                       
mass throughout ordinary spacetime—where mass density at a single point in                     
spacetime is a function of the dynamics of the wave function (Callender                       
2009)—with the world of everyday experience made up of tables, cats, and                       
stars and so on. 
 
A very important fact to note (a fact which we mentioned in the introduction) is                             
that collapse theories can be put to the test—if not always in practice, at least in                               
principle—insofar as they “give precise hints about where to look in order to put                           
into evidence, experimentally, possible violations of the superposition principle.”                 
(Ghirardi 2011) For example, according to Ghirardi:  
 
“[Spontaneous localization] being precisely formulated, allows one to               
locate precisely the ‘split’ between micro and macro, reversible and                   
irreversible, quantum and classical. The transition between the two types                   
of ‘regimes’ is governed by the number of particles which are well                       
localized at positions further apart than 10−5 cm in the two states whose                         
coherence is going to be dynamically suppressed.” (Ghirardi 2011) 
 
Such experiments would place an upper bound on the size and time scales at                           
which physical systems can be in superposition states, and thus also                     
non­arbitrary limits on collapse models such as GRW’s; in order to falsify                       
particular collapse models, all you have to do is experimentally demonstrate                     
maintenance of, for example, quantum superposition states at some size limit                     
where they are posited by such models not to persist.  21
21 Interestingly, Maximilian Schlosshauer, Johannes Kofler, and Anton Zeilinger, in ‘A Snapshot of                         
Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics’, surveyed 33 physicists at a conference                     
dedicated to the foundations of quantum mechanics, and found that exactly two thirds (67%) of                             
respondents replied that they thought that “[s]uperpositions of macroscopically distinct states” are                       
“in principle possible” (Schlosshauer, Kofler, Zeilinger 2013, p. 10). 
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The theoretical ramifications of such experiments in general were explored by                     
Anthony Leggett and Anupam Garg in 1985, in a paper entitled ‘Quantum                       
Mechanics Versus Macroscopic Realism: Is the Flux There When Nobody                   
Looks?’ In this paper Leggett and Garg theorize that so­called ‘macrorealistic’                     
alternatives to quantum mechanics are inconsistent with—apparently theoretical               
at the time —observations in macroscopic ‘coherence’ (i.e. interference /                 22
superposition) experiments. Macrorealism or ‘macroscopic realism’ is the               
assumption that, past a certain macroscopic limit, objects’ properties are always                     
definite (practically speaking, classical), as seems to be required by collapse                     
models. The assumption of macrorealism which is a prior, enabling condition of                       
such models would be falsified if a macroscopic coherence experiment was                     
successfully performed (Leggett and Garg 1985). In a recent discussion about                     
how experimental physics is finally able to put macrorealism to the test, the                         
physicist George C. Knee says the following: 
 
“Almost a century after the quantum revolution in science, it’s perhaps                     
surprising that physicists are still trying to prove the existence of                     
superpositions. The real motivation lies in the future of theoretical                   
physics. Fledgling theories of macrorealism may well form the basis of                     
the next generation “upgrade” to quantum theory by setting the scale of                       
the quantum­classical boundary. … [W]e can be sure that the boundary                     
cannot lie below the scale at which the cesium atom has been shown to                           
behave like a wave. How high is this scale? A theoretical measure of                         
macroscopicity … gives the cesium atom a modest ranking of 6.8 … far                         
below where most suspect the boundary lies. … In fact, matter­wave                     
interferometry experiments have already shown interference fringes with               
Buckminsterfullerene molecules, boasting a rating as high as 12. … The                     
next step is to try these experiments with atoms of larger mass,                       
superposed over longer time scales and separated by greater distances.                   
This will push the envelope of macroscopicity further and reveal yet more                       
22 Perhaps not wholly accurate. As Bacciagaluppi points out, as far back as 1984 states of                               
superposition were observed in the “macroscopic currents” (Bacciagaluppi 2012) of SQUIDS                     
(which are superconducting devices). 
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about the nature of the relationship between the quantum and the                     
macroworld.” (Knee 2015, p. 2) 
 
As a preliminary example of how physics might finally able to reveal much about                           
the nature of the relationship between the quantum and macroscopic worlds, the                       
physicists ​Roohollah ​Ghobadi et. al. argue that experiments which generate                   
states of superposition in macroscopic physical systems constitute direct tests                   
of collapse theories (which assume macrorealism) insofar as one can utilise                     
their results to see whether such superposition states persist on time­scales                     
longer than that at which collapse is postulated to take place, for example, on                           
the order of micro­seconds. Further, they argue that such experiments are                     
realisable with current technology (Ghobadi, Kumar, Pepper, Bouwmeester,               
Lvovsky, Simon 2014). Similarly, the physicists Dustin Kleckner et. al. propose                     
an experiment which would establish a lower­bound on the ‘nonclassicality’ of                     
‘relatively massive’ or macroscopic objects. They argue that the time­scale of                     
collapse mechanisms such as those which invoke gravitational collapse means                   
that if gravity collapses the wave functions of macroscopic objects then                     
superpositions will not be realized over the proposed time­scale of their                     
experiment (Kleckner, Pikovski, Jeffrey, Ament, Eliel, Brink and Bouwmeester                 
2008). 
 
More practically: in 2002 ​a group of experimental physicists led by Anton                       
Zeilinger demonstrated interference with buckyballs (fullerene C70) which are                 
macromolecules made up of 70 carbon atoms, which is an order of magnitude                         
larger than entities traditionally thought be be solely quantum such as photons                       
and electrons (​Brezger, Hackermüller, Uttenthaler, Petschinka, Arndt, and               
Zeilinger, 2002). Likewise, in 2013 interference was demonstrated with an entire                     
molecule made up of 810 atoms (made up of around 5000 protons, 5000                         
neutrons, and 5000 electrons) called C284.H190.F320.N4.S12. Allegedly,             
systems of this complexity are approaching the size of some primitive viruses                       
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(​Eibenberger, Gerlich, Arndt, Mayor, Tüxen 2013). On that point, other                   
researchers speculate that—technical difficulties aside—quantum interference           
experiments can in principle be set up in order to test for quantum superposition                           
in entities as complex as micro­organisms such as the flu virus (Romero­Isart,                       
Juan, Quidant and Cirac 2010). 
 
Perhaps most definitively: in 2010 a group of experimental physicists put a                       
metal paddle ​visible to the naked eye (30 micrometres across) into a                       
superposition state. Once they got over the technical problem of figuring out                       23
how to reliably get a mechanical entity into its ‘ground state’ (i.e. the state of                             
lowest energy permitted to it by the laws of quantum mechanics), the team were                           
able to cool the metal paddle until it reached this ground state, and then                           
connected it to a bona­fide quantum superconducting current which was                   
prepared in a superposition of ‘pushing’ and ‘not pushing’ simultaneously; once                     
connected, the physicists were able to detect the paddle (which was made up of                           
trillions of atoms) in a superposition state of vibrating and not vibrating at the                           
same time (O'Connell et al. 2010). 
 
Lev Vaidman, in his discussion of similar results, argues that the burden of proof                           
ultimately lies with the ​proponents rather than opponents of collapse theories,                     
insofar as it is they who posit “new physics beyond the well­tested Schrodinger                         
equation.” (Vaidman 2014) He makes the point that any observable                   
phenomena predicted by such models have simply not been detected                   
experimentally (up to the level of complexity which experimental physicists are                     
able to probe, given current technical limitations) and cites this situation as a                         
23 The idea of testing quantum mechanics’s application to macroscopic physical systems has been                           
hindered mostly by practical, rather than theoretical, problems. See e.g.: “[A] demonstration that                         
quantum mechanics applies equally to macroscopic mechanical systems has been a long­standing                       
challenge, hindered by the difficulty of cooling a mechanical mode to its quantum ground state.                             
The temperatures required are typically far below those attainable with standard cryogenic                       
methods, so significant effort has been devoted to developing alternative cooling techniques.”                       
(O’Connell et. al. 2010, abstract) 
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lack of evidence for any new physics beyond the deterministic, linear                     
Schrodinger dynamics, although he concedes that this merely means that                   
“some (but not all!) of these [collapse] models have been ruled out” (Vaidman                         
2014). What he means by this is that, although such experiments do not                         
definitively rule out ​all collapse theories, they at least place quantifiable                     
restrictions on the bounds within which such models can justifiably determine                     
collapse to take place (Vaidman 2014). Yet, as I have hopefully made clear,                         
these bounds are shrinking all the time and in fact the laws of quantum                           
mechanics have arguably been shown to apply to bona fide macroscopic                     
systems (most plausibly the metal paddle which was put into a superposition                       
state). 
 
Although obviously not definitive for all time, the empirical data wrested from the                         
macroscopic superposition experiments discussed in this section nevertheless               
suggest that there is currently no empirical evidence for a physical process that                         
causes wave functions to ‘collapse’ via, for example, spontaneous localization                   
or the effects of gravity at some macroscopic limit. Specifically, at the present                         
moment it appears that there is no exactly­quantifiable macroscopic limit one                     
can point to and say that is where linear evolution fails and some sort of                             
‘collapse’ process kicks in and determines the evolution of physical systems                     
instead. Because of this, at the present time there appears to be no conceptual                           
barrier in principle to the idea of extending quantum mechanics to the                       
macroscopic scale wholesale. 
 
As a suggestion of what the breakdown of this conceptual barrier entails, we will                           
take a detour through Erwin Schrodinger’s ‘Schrodinger’s cat’ thought                 
experiment, through which he sought to demonstrate what he saw as the                       
obvious and latent absurdity in taking the wave function evolving according to                       
the Schrodinger equation as an accurate and complete representation of all (i.e.                       
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microscopic ​and macroscopic) physical systems. In particular, Schrodinger               
wanted to probe whether sense could ultimately be made of regarding a                       
macroscopic physical system (in this case, a cat) as being in a superposition of                           
macroscopically distinct states—both alive and dead—at the same time.                 24
Schrodinger started by positing an imaginary physical set­up made up of a cat in                           
a box containing a vial of lethal gas which would either release or not release                             
depending on the outcome of a bona fide quantum event: nuclear decay. He                         
argued that the state of superposition would transfer from the microscopic                     
nucleus (which, per the quantum laws, would both decay and not decay) to the                           
vial of lethal gas (which subsequently would both release and not release) and                         
ultimately to the cat via the process of entanglement, whereupon the cat would                         
evolve into a superposition of being both alive and dead at the same time,                           
insofar as the uninterrupted linear evolution of the Schrodinger dynamics would                     
preserve superpositions. Many since have taken Schrodinger’s argument to                 
definitively demonstrate the absurdity of extending the laws of quantum                   
mechanics from the microscopic to the macroscopic realm.  
 
And yet in 2013 a group of physicists demonstrated entanglement between                     
microscopic and macroscopic physical systems when they detected microscopic                 
quantum fluctuations in a photon exhibiting strong quantum correlations (i.e.                   
entanglement) with macroscopic fluctuations in a group of 100 million photons                     
(Lvovsky, Ghobadi, Chandra, Prasad and Simon 2013). In their discussion of                     
this result, they write: 
 
“Although Schrödinger’s thought experiment was originally intended to               
convey the absurdity of applying quantum mechanics to macroscopic                 
24 Or perhaps for Schrodinger only until it is observed. As per the the orthodox interpretation of                                 
Schrodinger’s day, the cat would only exist in a superposition state of ​both alive ​and dead until it                                   
was observed on which its wave function would collapse to a definite ​either alive ​or dead state.                                 
Nevertheless for Schrodinger the prediction that the cat would exist in a superposition of                           
macroscopically distinct states ​before measurement was absurd enough in itself to warrant his                         
suspicion about extending the laws of quantum mechanics beyond the microscopic level. 
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objects, this experiment and related ones suggest that it may apply on all                         
scales.” (Lvovsky, Ghobadi, Chandra, Prasad and Simon 2013, p. 541) 
 
If the laws of quantum mechanics apply on all scales then the linear dynamics                           
are not confined solely to the microscopic level of reality and macroscopic                       
systems can also be considered to be described by a wave function which                         
obeys the Schrodinger evolution (that is, prior to measurement, at least;                     
remember that we still haven’t really ‘solved’ the measurement problem). What                     





Insofar as recent experiments suggest that there is currently no empirical                     
evidence for a process of collapse (i.e. von Neumann’s Process 1), and                       
furthermore that entanglement can transfer between microscopic and               
macroscopic physical systems, then solving the equations of motion for such a                       
theory returns this result where the linear dynamics ​always determine the                     
evolutions that ​all physical systems undergo (Ney 2013b, p. 170). Accordingly                     
everything, including macroscopic physical systems, can be represented by a                   
wave function obeying the Schrodinger equation. That is, on such a theory,                       
quantum dynamics are ​unitary ​(Zurek 2010, p. 416) and there is no                       
quantum­classical boundary. Since the same laws apply at every level,                   
macroscopic physical systems such as measuring devices etc. can become                   
entangled with superposed entities such as photons and evolve into                   
superposition states themselves (insofar as entanglement is a process which                   
amplifies microsuperposition to macrosuperposition). Take this line of thought to                   
its logical conclusion, and it’s perfectly clear what the quantum algorithm                     
predicts in general: measuring devices (including the brains of observers) will                     
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always be sensitive to all the amplitudes of the wave function and really should                           
register superpositions of all possible measurement outcomes.  
 
However, observers’ experiences aren’t anything like that when they run                   
quantum experiments; for example, device readouts are never observed to                   
display ​both up ​and down at the same time—observers always experience                     
definite measurement outcomes instead. The problem with unitary quantum                 
mechanics is thus the problem of working out how a quantum theory which                         
describes all physical systems at all times could ever correspond to the manifest                         
definiteness of observers’ experiences: how could entangling interactions               
between superposed entities ever yield definite measurement outcomes? Thus                 
we’re led straight back to the measurement problem, this time in the guise of the                             
‘macroscopic superposition problem’ (although they are essentially the same                 
thing), succinctly described by Valia Allori: 
 
“[I]f the wave function completely describes physical systems, and it                   
evolves according to the Schrödinger equation, then … macroscopic                 
superpositions that we clearly never observe … are produced.” (Allori                   
2013, pp. 66­67) 
 
The problem of macroscopic superposition is thus the problem of accounting for                       
what it could mean for there to be superpositions of distinct states for                         
macroscopic physical systems as the unitary dynamics predicts (Ghirardi 2011).                   
Essentially, we are brought right back to the perplexing question of why, given                         
all the undeniable successes of quantum theory, it also predicts physical states                       
that are manifestly never observed. How do you make sense of the idea of                           
macroscopic objects in states of superposition when it always seems that their                       
wave functions collapse onto definite measurement outcomes when they are                   
observed? Why, if the dynamics are linear and unitary, does the macroscopic                       
world ​appear classical? (Faye 2014) Put simply: whence the manifest image?                     
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According to Jim Hartle, questions surrounding the problem of macroscopic                   
superposition form a “key part of the general question of the emergence of                         
classical behaviour from quantum theory” (Hartle 2010, p. 99) in general. This                       
question essentially concerns the task of grounding the connections between                   
appearance and reality i.e. the manifest and scientific images of nature,                     
which—if you’ll think back to the introduction—just happens to be the question                       
this essay is invested in exploring. In order to adequately solve this problem,                         
you at least need a physically­sensible theory which coheres with the all the                         
available experimental data. Yet, being empirically­inadequate, collapse             





Hugh Everett III developed his ‘pure wave mechanics’ primarily in response to                       
conceptual difficulties thrown up by the collapse postulate. Everett sought an                     25
interpretation which eliminated the collapse postulate from the orthodox                 
quantum dynamics, and yet nevertheless provides a complete physical theory                   
insofar as the wave function always evolving via the Schrodinger dynamics                     
accurately and completely describes all physical systems at all times. The main                       
interpretational task of Everett’s pure wave mechanics is thus to explain                     
observers’ experiences of definite measurement outcomes (i.e. the appearance                 
of a single manifest world) without reference to some arbitrary collapse process                       
which breaks the linear dynamics. Everettians simply dis­solve the                 26
measurement problem by rejecting the assumption that definite measurement                 
25 For example the facts that collapse is “indeterministic and non­linear, respecting none of the                             
spacetime or dynamical symmetries” (Saunders 2010, p. 3). 
26 That is, proponents of such theories claim that quantum mechanics provides its own                           
interpretation or that quantum mechanics should be interpreted literally when it describes                       
superpositions of measurement outcomes (Faye 2014), and that pure wave mechanics is merely                         
the result of such an attitude. 
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outcomes capture the true nature of reality (Faye 2014). Instead they argue that                         
macroscopically distinct states of superposition can be considered meaningful                 
after all (Bacciagaluppi 2012).  
 
Pure wave mechanics ultimately attempts to square orthodox quantum                 
mechanics’s empirical virtues (such as the ​appearance of collapse) with what                     
the unitary quantum dynamics predict by recapturing observers’ experiences in                   27
terms of “determinate relative measurement records” (Barrett 2014). Central to                   
Everett’s solution to the measurement problem is the distinction between the                     
absolute state and relative states of physical systems (Barrett 2014), from which                       
he derives his principle of the ‘fundamental relativity of states’ (Everett 1956, p.                         
103). This is the principle that subsystems of a composite physical system’s                       
states are not independent from the states of the rest of the system because the                             
subsystems’ states are correlated (entangled) with eachother (Barrett 2014).                 
Thus, according to Everett: 
 
“It is meaningless to ask the absolute state of a subsystem—one can                       
only ask the state relative to a given state of the remainder of the                           
subsystem.” (Everett 1956, p. 103)  
 
Taking Everett’s principle of the fundamental relativity of states on board, if you                         
consider the ​absolute state of a physical system, then there are no definite                         
measurement outcomes; however if you consider the ​relative states of a                     
physical system, there are definite measurement outcomes (Barrett 2014). For                   
example, consider a composite physical system made up of an observer, a                       
measuring device, and a photon, which are each its subsystems. Measurement                     
understood as entangling interaction entails that the measuring device, on                   
measuring the photon, evolves into a state of entangled superposition; likewise                     
27 Where ‘observers’ are themselves considered physical systems, made of particles, and thus                         
subject to the laws of quantum mechanics. 
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the observer, on observing the readout on the measuring device, evolves into a                         
superposition of experiencing all possible states of the device. The ​absolute                     
state of the composite system is thus indefinite, while each of its terms are in                             
definite, ​relative states, corresponding to ‘eigenstates’ of the observed variable                   
(Barrett 2014). Thus on Everett’s interpretation, each term in the entangled                     
superposition explicitly represents a different observer experiencing a definite                 
measurement outcome. 
 
A number of questions may be raised at this point regarding the “empirical                         
faithfulness” (Barrett 2014) of the Everett interpretation, which may appear                   
radically discontinuous with experience at first glance. One question concerns                   
the extra structure corresponding to the ‘branches’ of the absolute wave function                       
that observers don’t experience; along with the question of why observers don’t                       
experience these other branches. A directly­related question concerns how to                   28
pinpoint experience in this theory. For example, Craig Callender asks where, in                       
the structure of the wave function, does an observer’s experience of definite                       
measurement outcomes supervene? (Callender 2009). Addressing these             
problems will be instructive in further elaborating the empirical consistency                   
between Everett’s conception of reality and the manifest world that we all                       
experience.  
 
To take the second question first: Everett states that in order to be empirically                           
acceptable, a scientific theory need not be isomorphic to experience; rather it is                         
enough to find a homomorphism (a structure­preserving representation)               
between the theory and experience instead (Barrett 2014). Everett then                   
pinpoints observers’ experiences of definite measurement outcomes in their                 
‘relative memory records’. What Everett means by this explanation is to suggest                       
28 The wave function of a macroscopic physical system in a superposition of macroscopically                           
distinct states have peaking amplitudes which are well­separated in configuration space; these                       
amplitudes may be described as ‘branches’. 
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that definite outcomes are represented by specifying a decomposition of the                     
absolute state which correlates a measurement outcome with the corresponding                   
relative memory record. So given the linearity of the Schrodinger dynamics,                     
after measurement every possible outcome will be represented in the entangled                     
superposition state as a sequent in a sequence of relative measurement                     
outcomes (which includes an observer’s memory records). Thus, in the absolute                     
state of a composite physical system, the terms of the superposition correspond                       
to different relative measurement outcomes; all possible outcomes can each be                     
specified by a relative memory record so an observer’s experience is always                       
able to be pinpointed by specifying such a record which is homomorphic to it                           
(Barrett 2014). 
 
The question regarding why observers don’t experience these other branches of                     
the wave function was also partly addressed by Everett when he stated that                         
while which outcome an observer experiences is a ​relative fact, that it seems to                           
an observer that they experience a definite outcome is an​absolute fact (Barrett                         
2014). This entails that it will always​seem to an observer that they experience a                             
definite measurement outcome, when, in reality, they experience every possible                   
outcome (Barrett 2014). So although the objective, outside, or ‘bird’s eye’                     
(Tegmark 2008) perspective of the wave function represents a multiplicity of all                       
possible measurement outcomes taking place, from the subjective, inside, or                   
‘frog’s eye’ (Tegmark 2008) perspective only definite measurement outcomes                 
are observed. This is arguably due to the process of ‘environmental                     
decoherence’, which, although not known in its full details by Everett himself,                       
gives legs to his explanation of why the other branches of the wave function                           
aren’t experienced. The short explanation is that decoherence—as suppression                 
of coherence i.e. superposition—means that interference between terms in the                   
wave function describing distinct histories almost instantaneously vanishes at                 
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the macroscopic scale. Decoherence causes the interference term in wave                   29
functions (responsible for superposition) to be suppressed not as a result of                       
measurement, but rather as a result of a physical system’s interaction with its                         
environment (Bacciagaluppi 2012). Because decoherence suppresses           
interference in very short orders of time, at very small spatial magnitudes, this                         
makes macroscopic branching practically impossible to experience, since               
experience takes place at a far more coarse temporal grain than the one that is                             
subject to decoherence (Bacciagaluppi 2012). 
 
In the philosophy and physics literature, the ‘branches’ of the wave function are                         
often casually referred to as ‘worlds’ outright. However ‘worlds’ are not precisely                       
delineated entities in the underlying struture of Everett’s original formulation of                     
pure wave mechanics. This is because, according to David Wallace, ‘worlds’ are                       
typically construed as temporally­extended structures, so identity over time is a                     
necessary condition for identifying them, and yet there is an arbitrary amount of                         
ways to decompose the wave function into mutually orthogonal states due to                       
Everett’s original principle of the relativity of states which allows for arbitrary                       
decompositions of the absolute state of a physical system into any basis (Barrett                         
2014). This follows from Everett’s operationalism which leads him to take all                       30
branches in all bases as real, insofar as the linearity of the Schrodinger                         
dynamics requires pure wave mechanics to assign reality to every relative state                       
because all branches of the wave function always have the potentiality to                       
interact with eachother, meaning that all branches in all bases have potential                       
empirical consequences (Barrett 2014). Taking Everettian branches to explicitly                 
represent worlds thus requires specifying some ‘preferred basis’ from which                   
they can exhibit diachronic identity. David Wallace points out that decoherence                     
itself selects such a basis because it specifies a set of preferred variables and                           
29 For what it’s worth Zurek 1998 and Zeh 2000 suggest that decoherence incorporates itself most                               
naturally with Everettian interpretations (Bacciagaluppi 2012). 
30 Operationalism is an epistemic stance which takes anything that has potential empirical or                           
observational consequences to be real (Barrett 2014). 
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enables reidentification of these states over time. This is because decoherence                     
happens when the environment of a system under scrutiny—e.g. “stray                   
particles” in the system’s environment (Bacciagaluppi 2012)—entangles itself               
with that system, causing the environment to continually ‘observe’ or ‘measure’                     
some preferred variable of the system, making these ‘preferred states’ relatively                     
stable in the process. Because interaction potentials are generally a function of                       
position, the set of preferred variables is mostly related to the ‘classical                       
observables’ position and, given the indeterminacy relations, momentum               
(Bacciagaluppi 2012). Environmental interactions then privilege ‘measuring’             
some approximate position or momentum eigenstates, as a general rule. The                     
preferred states of these classical observables are made ‘robust’ via a process                       31
called ‘superselection’ which happens when information about a physical                 
system is lost to and then stored in the environment (Bacciagaluppi 2012). 
 
A consequence of this is that ‘worlds’ can be defined as, e.g., the “decoherent                           
histories” (Wallace 2010) of such states. Following Wallace I will define                     32
‘worlds’ as temporally­extended histories that ‘branch’ from the wave function                   
via a process of decoherence which also grounds their stability. ​This                     33
explanation has the consequence that there is no ‘problem of preferred basis’                       
because specifying such a basis need not be an additional, arbitrary postulate:                       
such a structure emerges naturally from the decoherent dynamics of the wave                       
function in­itself (Bacciagaluppi 2012). Understood in this way, every term or                     
31 Robustness in this context just means that because the relevant information is being stored in                               
the system’s environment, an ‘observer’ can reliably pick up this information directly from the                           
environment, without further disturbing the system (Bacciagaluppi 2012). 
32 Another way of putting it is that decoherence causes branches of the wave function to                               
“dynamically isolate” themselves from one another (Saunders 2010, pp. 4­5) and “it is the                           
dynamical isolation of these branches that makes them Everett worlds” (Ladyman 2010, p. 157).                           
This is because dynamical isolation enables the formal reidentification of wave trajectories over                         
time (Bacciagaluppi 2012) and thus grounds a diachronic identity for ‘worlds’ as stable,                         
dynamically­separated ‘branches’ of the wave function (Saunders 2010, p. 5). 
33 Of course, according to Wallace the concept of ‘splitting’ is only approximate i.e. FAPP (for all                                 
practical purposes). Nevertheless the theory is empirically­adequate insofar as it grounds                     
experience and gets the correct predictions for quantum experiments (Wallace 2010). 
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amplitude in the wave function which represents a distinct measurement                   
outcome represents a stable ‘branch’ and therefore a ‘world’ (Allori 2013, p. 69):                         
hence why this interpretation is popularly known as ‘Many­Worlds’. These                   
worlds are differentiated from eachother by virtue of having at least one physical                         
system in a different microphysical state.   34
 
So to summarise how pure wave mechanics deals with the measurement                     
problem: if the state of something (such as the readout of a measuring device)                           
interacts with something else (such as the state of a photon), then those two                           
things can become correlated, and thus entangled. Measuring devices tend to                     
become entangled with their environments (stuff extraneous to the physical                   
system under scrutiny) to such an extent that the amplitudes of their wave                         
functions can no longer interfere due to coherent information constantly being                     
lost to the environment: when measurement (as a form of entangling interaction)                       
decoheres the wave functions of superposed quantum systems, this means that                     
coherent information is lost to the environment and their amplitudes are no                       
longer interfering with eachother. Yet the amplitudes of the wave function are                       
required to be precisely aligned in order to exhibit interference. Hence why                       
interference effects (and thus superpositions of measurement outcomes, etc.)                 
are never able to be observed or measured at the macroscopic level.  
 
Furthermore, the possible physical configurations that these amplitudes               
represent can thus be regarded for all practical purposes as their own worlds                         
insofar as they evolve approximately independently from eachother into their                   
own branches of the wave function. Accordingly, for pure wave mechanics                     
Schrodinger’s cat really​is dead and alive at the same time and, furthermore, if a                             
physicist decides to measure the state of the cat, then this corresponds to a                           
34 In more technical terms: if worlds are differentiated by virtue of having at least one object in a                                     
different state, this means that different states are orthogonal to eachother (because orthogonality                         
entails possessing different eigenvalues), such that ‘worlds’ can be defined as mutually orthogonal                         
states (Barrett 2014). 
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situation where there really are multiple observers, each of whom experiences a                       
distinct, definite state of the cat (Wilson 2013, p. 583). 
 
Insofar as interference is a paradigmatically quantum phenomenon,               
decoherence, which causes physical systems to exhibit “negligible interference”                 
(Halliwell 2010, p. 99) leads to approximately classical behaviour. That is, if                       35
you take decoherence into account, you can treat a quantum event (such as a                           
photon landing on a screen) as a consequence of an individual component of a                           
wave function (​either the photon travelled through the left slit, ​or it travelled                         
through the right slit), rather than having to treat each and every component of                           
the wave function interfering with eachother as contributing to the final outcome                       
(Bacciagaluppi 2012). More generally, the probabilities for measurement               
outcomes can be treated classically, ‘as if’ the wave function has ‘collapsed’ to a                           
definite value. Decoherence thus secures the ​appearance of collapse in a                     
phenomenological sense (Bacciagaluppi 2012). This likewise allows one to                 
recover a ‘quasiclassical’ dynamics, for example, approximately Newtonian               
trajectories, and so on (Bacciagaluppi 2012).   36
 
35 Incidentally, decoherence is one of the technical reasons why superposition experiments with                         
macroscopic physical systems have not been able to be performed until relatively recently. This is                             
because decoherence places limits on physicists’ ability to preserve quantum properties such as                         
interference at the macroscopic scale: sensitivity to environmental interaction grows exponentially                     
with the size of the physical system involved, due to the increasing likelihood of one of the                                 
system’s particles being disturbed by, for example, stray particles in its environment and becoming                           
entangled with it, which leads rapidly to loss of coherence (this is the reason why quantum                               
computers must be shielded from decoherence also). See e.g. Sadegh Raeisi, Pavel Sekatski, and                           
Christoph Simon 2011 where they argue that the possibility of directly measuring the presence of                             
micro­macro entanglement of superposition approaches 0 as system complexity (size) increases;                     
most states of macroscopic superposition can therefore only be inferred indirectly from interference                         
experiments, for example. However recent advances in technology allowing such physical systems                       
to be ‘shielded’ from decoherence have made many such experiments feasible.  
36 This point has been generalized in a result known as Ehrenfest’s theorem, which states that                               
since the ‘preferred states’ picked out by decoherence are generally wave functions localized in                           
position (i.e. ‘wave packets’). These localized wave packets’ dynamics can then be treated as                           
approximately Newtonian (Bacciagaluppi 2012). 
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According to Hartle, decoherence likewise implies coarse­grained classical               
behaviour “well above the Planck scale” (Hartle 2010, pp. 92­93) due to                       
following conservation laws such as the “conservation of energy and                   
momentum” (Hartle 2010, pp. 92­93). This is because decoherence is a process                       
that separates the variables describing a physical system into ‘fast’ and ‘slow’                       
(Halliwell 2010, pp. 99­100). The ‘slow’ variables of a physical system are its                         
“local densities” (Halliwell 2010, pp. 99­100) which obey conservation laws;                   
these conserved densities allow a physical system which is described by                     
quantum mechanics at the microscopic level to be described classically at the                       
macroscopic level, insofar as “exactly conserved quantities obey superselection                 
rules” (Halliwell 2010, pp. 99­100) which preserve “local density eigenstates” in                     
“time evolution”, causing them to “behave quasiclassically” (Halliwell 2010, p.                   
114).  
 
Decoherence thus arguably grounds the connection between the manifest                 
image of experience from the scientific image of quantum mechanics more                     
generally. On this view, the manifest image corresponds to some ‘quasiclassical                     
realm’ that reduces to a decoherent history of the wave function. The                       
relationship between the “quasiclassical realms” (Hartle 2010) of everyday                 
experience and the image of the world implied by quantum mechanics is argued                         
by Hartle to be “top­down—proceeding from the classical world to the quantum”                       
(Hartle 2010, p. 92). Likewise, Ladyman notes that “[t]he physics of                     
decoherence is a top­down reduction.” (Ladyman 2010, p. 157) That is, given a                         
pre­supposed description, in terms of the higher­level concepts of classical                   
physics, of the manifest image of everyday macroscopic objects such as chairs,                       




“[T]he macroworld is recovered only as a coarse­grained feature of the                     
microscopic world not as a precise and definite entity in its own right.”                         
(Ladyman 2010, p. 158) 
 
According to this view, quantum systems exhibit classical behaviour when their                     
histories for motion exhibit a ‘coarse­graining’ that singles out variables whose                     
values are averages of conserved quantities; furthermore these are what “define                     
quasiclassical realms” (Hartle 2010, pp. 92­93) insofar as their evolution can be                       
approximately described by classical laws. Within such decoherent histories                 
there needs to be some variables you can identify with familiar macroscopic                       
objects; these variables are given by the densities of conserved quantities which                       
are stable in time evolution in order to satisfy typical descriptions of classical                         
behaviour: 
 
“The familiar quasiclassical domain is characterized by local densities                 
obeying closed sets of deterministic evolution equations. This domain                 
may also be referred to as a reduced description of the quantum system”                         
(Halliwell 2010, p. 114). 
 
Everett states that pure wave mechanics allows one to understand reality both                       
as “objectively continuous and causal, while subjectively discontinuous and                 
probabilistic” (Everett 1956, p. 78). Thus Everett’s interpretation arguably                 37
allows one to understand quantum mechanics as a theory which the captures                       
the most important aspects of the scientific and manifest images of nature,                       
respectively. 
 
37 To take a simplified model: if you have a radioactive element with a half­life of, say, an hour, and                                       
which is subject to quantum laws, such that, on average, half of it will have decayed after an hour                                     
is up, then there is no way of predicting which of it will decay, no matter how complete your                                     
knowledge of the overall system. This is because since all measurement outcomes occur, you                           
would have to be able to predict which branch of the wave function you ‘end up in’, but since you                                       
really you end up in them all, this would be impossible to do. Hence the subjective stochasticity in                                   
the face of objective determinism. 
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Proponents of Everett’s interpretation argue that it is the ‘pure’ interpretation of                       
quantum mechanics insofar as it posits no additional structure beyond the wave                       
function and the Schrodinger equation which determines its evolution: these                   
‘many worlds’ emerge solely from the physical formalism of the universal wave                       
function evolving deterministically according to the Schrodinger equation. A                 
consequence of this is that, if a physical process of, say, spontaneous                       
localization or gravitational collapse is ever verified at some definite                   
macroscopic limit, then this phenomenon would constitute a direct refutation of                     
pure wave mechanics. Conversely, experimental demonstration of macroscopic               
objects exhibiting interference effects should be regarded as constituting                 
empirical evidence for the truth of pure wave mechanics. Indeed, according to                       
Jeffrey Barrett, “​any experiment that illustrates quantum interference provides                 
empirical evidence for the operational existence of alternative … branches”                   
(Barrett 2014, emphasis added). The upshot is that, at the present moment in                         
time at least, the available empirical evidence suggests the reality of                     
macroscopic superposition (and so the existence of ‘many worlds’), as opposed                     
to some definite reality.  38
 
Nevertheless many people are deeply unsettled by pure wave mechanics                   
insofar as it entails that anything that can happen, does happen, in a different                           
world (Allori 2013, p. 69). This is because the dynamics of pure wave                         
mechanics predict that the wave function of the universe evolves through every                       
single one of its possible states. So here we have a theory which does violence                             
to most people’s a priori criterion of sensibility, insofar as it doesn’t take much                           
power of imagination to realise that pure wave mechanics leads to absurd                       
consequences (within the realms of physical possibility)—in fact potentially an                   
infinity of them! For example, the dynamics of pure wave mechanics entail that a                           
future ‘you’ will necessarily evolve into a world where you will, to take a                           
38 cf. the discussion of the empirical (dis)confirmation of quantum phenomena such as                         
superposition at the macroscopic level in the section on dynamical collapse theories. 
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suggestive example, walk into your kitchen to find an elephant standing there                       
(or more likely a baby elephant if your kitchen is small). That’s the ‘elephant in                             
the room’ for pure wave mechanics, so to speak. A physical theory should at                           





Albert Einstein, too, was deeply unsettled by many of quantum mechanics’s                     
implications (such as its apparent incompatibility with Special Relativity), and                   
due to this disconcertment wanted to figure out whether “the wave function                       
[gives] us an ontologically complete representation of a system at a time” (Ney                         
2013a, p. 19). Einstein realised that if the wave function was proved to be an                             
incorrect or at least incomplete description of reality, then this would nullify                       
many of quantum mechanics’s implications that he found distasteful and so to                       
that end, he, along with the physicists Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen (EPR),                         
devised a thought experiment designed to show that the wave function                     
representation is incomplete. EPR argued that if the wave function does not                       
represent the complete reality of physical systems, then some ‘hidden variables’                   
must be posited alongside it in order to form a deeper, more complete                           39
physical theory from which quantum phenomena emerge as “equilibrium                 
statistical effects” (Bacciagaluppi 2012). According to these so­called ‘hidden                 
variables’ theories, the real ontology of quantum mechanics is ‘hidden’, i.e. not                       
captured within the description given by the wave function on its own. These                         
hidden variables constitute the ‘primary’ (Maudlin 2013) or ‘primitive’ (Allori                   
2013) ontology of quantum mechanics, i.e. what the macro­objects in the                     
ordinary world of experience are ​really​ made up of (Saunders 2010, pp. 4­5).  
39 Some sort of additional parameters or equations not contained within the wave function                           
description (Saunders 2010, p. 4­5). 
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In fact, strictly speaking, hidden variables theories are not even really                     
‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics in the strict sense; insofar as they posit a                         
different ontology and dynamics they are in fact different—although                 
empirically­equivalent —theories altogether.  40
 
The EPR argument goes (roughly ) as follows: EPR point out that quantum                       41
mechanics entails that it is impossible to predict with certainty what the value of                           
a variable will be prior to measurement, since the wave functions of physical                         
systems only give you the ​probabilities for measurement outcomes on those                     
systems. Furthermore, they point out that if a measurement is performed on a                         
particle in an entangled physical system, knowledge of the state of the other                         
particle is thereby gained without having to perform a measurement on it,                       
because, as an element in an entangled system, its spin (for example) can be                           
known to be necessarily anti­correlated with the value of the other particle’s spin                         
(Krips 2007). This fact is seen if you consider a version of EPR’s thought                           
experiment developed by the physicist David Bohm (EPRB). In the EPRB                     
experiment, a pair of electrons are prepared in the state of entangled spin                         
known as the singlet state (Ney 2013a, p. 19) 
 
singlet ​= |x­spin up>​1 |x­spin down>​2 + |x­spin down>​1ψ     √
1 2       √1 2         √1 2       √1 2  
|x­spin up>​2 
 
Bohm argues that the singlet state spin correlations mirror the standard EPR                       
correlations, and so the measured spin­values are known to always be                     
negatively correlated (for example if one electron is measured to have a positive                         
spin value, then the other will necessarily be measured to have the opposite                         
40 Sheldon Goldstein: “Bohmian mechanics is empirically equivalent to orthodox quantum theory”                       
(Goldstein 2013). 
41 What follows will not be a reconstruction of any particular argument EPR actually gave, but                               
rather a construction of an EPR­style argument more generally. 
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negative spin value, and vice­versa). That is, because the singlet state is a                         42
state of entangled superposition of spin, one cannot have intrinsic knowledge                     
the states of the individual electrons; rather one can only have the correlational                         
knowledge that their spin states are opposite (Ney 2013a, p. 19). After the                         
electrons are prepared in the singlet state, they each fly off into space in                           
different directions, such that they can be considered “out of each other's                       
immediate spheres of influence, so that a disturbance of [one] has no immediate                         
effect upon [the other]” (Krips 2007). This state of affairs entails that if two                           
physicists, Alice and Bob, decide to perform a measurement on one of the                         
electrons, then if Alice’s particle is measured to have a positive spin value +1/2,                           
Bob’s particle will necessarily be measured to have a negative spin value ­1/2,                         
and vice­versa. 
 
EPR assume that “when they are spatially separated, some “reality” pertains to                       
both components of the combined system.” (Fine 2013) This is due to the                         
principle of ‘separability’, which they assume outright. Separability is the                   
principle that quantum systems have realities independent from goings on at                     
separate systems: an independent reality pertains to all quantum systems, even                     
when these systems are entangled and thus described by the same wave                       
function (Fine 2013). Likewise, EPR take the principle of ‘locality’ as                     
axiomatic—not surprising given its centrality to Einstein’s theory of Special                   
Relativity. Locality is the principle that “if two systems are far enough apart, the                           
measurement (or absence of measurement) of one system does not directly                     
affect the reality that pertains to the unmeasured system.” (Fine 2013) So for                         
EPR a measurement on one particle in an entangled system can have no                         
instantaneous effect on the state of the other particle, due to the principles                         
separability and locality: 
 
42 This is due to the law of conservation of angular momentum which entails that total spin angular                                   
momentum must always equal zero. 
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“In Einstein's arguments the locality principle makes explicit reference to                   
the reality of the unmeasured system (no immediate influence on the                     
reality there due to measurements made elsewhere).” (Fine 2013) 
 
Basically, for EPR the principles of locality and separability ‘decontextualize’ the                     
reality of a quantum system from the reality of a separate system, even if those                             
systems are entangled, such that no changes with respect to what is real can                           
take place in one system as a consequence of a measurement on another (Fine                           
2013). As Einstein puts it in a letter to Max Born, separability­locality entails that                           
physical systems situated in different parts of space­time maintain an                   
independent existence from eachother: 
 
“It is … characteristic of … physical objects that they are thought of as                           
arranged in a space­time continuum. An essential aspect of this                   
arrangement … is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to an existence                           
independent of one another, provided these objects “are situated in                   
different parts of space”. … The following idea characterizes the relative                     
independence of objects (A and B) far apart in space: external influence                       
on A has no direct influence on B.” (Einstein 1948) 
 
EPR’s thought experiment suggests that a direct measurement by Alice on her                       
particle constitutes a sort of ‘indirect’ measurement Bob’s particle insofar as this                       
information allows Alice to predict the measurement outcome on Bob’s particle                     
with probability 1 (Fine 2013). However since these systems cannot be                     
interacting (given locality and separability), it yields this information                 
at­a­distance insofar as a measurement performed on one particle in an                     
entangled system seems to instantaneously determine the state of the the other                       
particle, even if the particles are separated by a distance such that no influence                           
could possibly be transmitted between them in the time it takes to run the                           
experiment without explicitly violating the speed­limit placed on               
information­transfer by his theory of Special Relativity, because the probabilities                   
for measurement outcomes on Bob’s particle given by the wave function (which,                       
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per the laws of quantum mechanics, are indefinite prior to measurement)                     
instantaneously change. For example, measurement of the spin of one electron                     
instantly determines the probability—i.e. from 50% to 100% / 0%—of measuring                     
the other electron as having opposite spin. That is, before measurement, each                       
electron has 50% chance of being measured to have x­spin up; however after                         
measurement of the first particle as having x­spin up or down; it is then                           
instantaneously known that the second particle has either 0% or 100%                     
probability of being measured to have x­spin up or x­spin down (Ney 2013a, pp.                           
19­20). Einstein designated this ‘spooky action at a distance’ because he                     
argued that the instantaneous change in probabilities would have to correlate to                       
some real, nonlocal change in the physical state of the system. Thus according                         
to standard quantum mechanics, entanglement: 
 
“[M]akes the reality [of the second system] depend upon the process of                       
measurement carried out on the first system, which does not in any way                         
disturb the second system. No reasonable definition of reality could be                     
expected to permit this.” (EPR 1935, p. 780) 
 
Since “[s]eparability supposes that there is a real state of affairs and locality                         
supposes that one cannot influence it immediately by acting at a distance.” (Fine                         
2013), EPR argue that what their thought experiment shows is that there must                         
be some definite ‘hidden variables’ locally determining the probabilities for                   
measurement outcomes not taken into account by the wave function. EPR                     
establish this by arguing that since locality prohibits instantaneous influence                   
between separate physical systems in a state of entanglement, and because                     
through measurements on one particle in such a system knowledge is thereby                       
gained of the other particle’s variable without having measured it, then due to                         




“If without in any way disturbing a system we can predict with certainty …                           
the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical                         
reality corresponding to this physical quantity” (EPR 1935, p. 778). 
 
That is, if you can predict the value of a physical quantity with certainty, then an                               
‘element of reality’ corresponds to it. Because for EPR “every element of                       
physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory” (Fine 2013), and                         
because wave functions don’t contain such counterparts, this means that the                     
wave function is an incomplete representation of reality. 
 
To summarise: if you consider the total wave function for Alice and Bob’s                         
entangled electrons (i.e. the singlet state), then, given the assumptions ‘locality’                     
and ‘separability’, the state of Bob’s electron cannot depend upon any                     
measurements made on Alice’s electron. Due to conservation laws, a                   
measurement by Alice on her electron allows her to instantaneously infer the                       
measurement outcome on Bob’s electron with probability 1. Because of                   
this—given the ‘Criterion of Reality’—the value of the spin variable on Bob’s                       
electron must be considered to correspond to its ‘elements of reality’, since it                         
can be predicted with certainty without having to go to the bother of directly                           
influencing it. In essence, for EPR these ‘elements of reality’ are “are further                         
hidden facts about [Alice and Bob’s electrons’] individual spins that ensure their                       
states are correlated in the appropriate way” (Ney 2013a, p. 20) in order to                           
ensure that there is nothing nonlocal happening in the context of measurements                       
on Alice and Bob’s entangled particles. Yet because the wave function of the                         
combined (Alice + Bob) system does not specify these ‘further hidden facts’,                       
EPR argue that the wave function representation of quantum mechanics must                     
be considered incomplete (Fine 2013). As Abner Shimony puts it: 
 
“[I]n order to avoid an appeal to nonlocality these correlations could only                       
be explained by “elements of physical reality” in each particle … and                       
since this description is richer than … Quantum Mechanics their                   
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conclusion is effectively an argument for a hidden variables                 
interpretation.” (Shimony 2009) 
 
‘Hidden variables’ interpretation more generally are deterministic, no­collapse               
theories which reject “the assumption that the quantum state is a complete                       





The most prominent of hidden variables theories is ‘Bohmian mechanics’—also                   
known as de Broglie­Bohm theory—developed by the American physicist David                   
Bohm (building off an earlier hidden variables theory formulated the Italian                     
physicist Louis de Broglie in the 1920s). Faced with the measurement problem,                       
Bohm—“explicitly influenced by … EPR” (Ney 2013a, p. 29)—decided to add                     
new physics to the wave function i.e. actual configurations of particles                     
(Goldstein 2013).  
 
According to Bohm’s theory, a full description of a physical system would be its                           
wave function—reconstituted as an “ontological pilot wave (a complex­valued                 
field in configuration space)” (Valentini 2010, p. 476)—supplemented by                 
additional variables which specify the positions of the particles which make it up                         
(and which constitute the real, ‘primitive’ ontology). Bohmian mechanics’s                 43
ontology is thus dualistic insofar as it is committed to the existence of both the                             
wave function ​and particles (Ney 2013a, p. 38). These particles exist in the                         
3­dimensional space that we all experience whereas the wave function ‘lives on’                       
abstract ‘configuration space’ (Valentini 2010, p. 484). The wave function                   
43 “The wave function would seem to be part of the ontology. It’s real in that sense. It’s not                                     
subjective in Bohmian mechanics—it has a rather real role to play: it has to govern the motion of                                   
the particles. But it’s not part of the primitive ontology. Bohmian mechanics is fundamentally about                             
particles and their motions, and not wave functions.” (Goldstein and Zanghì 2013, p. 94) 
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describes “the state of the [pilot] wave [where the] role of this wave is to guide                               
the particle into various states” (Ney 2013a, p. 30) in a precise (i.e.                         
deterministic) way (Bacciagaluppi 2012). There is therefore nothing random                 
about the evolution of Bohmian systems. According to the Bohmian view, the                       
particles which make up physical systems always have definite positions and                     
trajectories in the classical sense (Callender 2009). 
 
Because Bohmian mechanics is fundamentally a theory which describes how                   
configurations of particles change their positions in time, first­order in or                     
fundamental to the Bohmian description is the velocity of the particles i.e. the                         
rate of change in their positions (Goldstein 2013). So in addition to the                         
Schrodinger equation Bohmian mechanics adds “an equation of motion for the                     








which “expresses the velocities of the particles in terms of the wave function”                         
(Goldstein 2013).  
 
To bring it back to the double­slit experiment: the Bohmian explanation of the                         
motion responsible for the interference pattern built up through repeated                   
iterations of the double­slit experiment is that, insofar as Bohmian mechanics                     
describes particles’ motions via postulating that particles are guided by waves,                     
then the interference pattern is understood to be impressed on the particle by                         
the wave. Although the particle definitely travels through one slit only, the wave                         
travels through both slits, generating interference—because the slits cause the                   
amplitudes of wave to overlap—yet this wave still guides the motion of the                         
particle in line with the observed interference pattern: the particle hits most often                         
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where the amplitudes reinforce and never where the amplitudes cancel out, and                       
so on (Goldstein 2013). 
 
Bohmian mechanics is a mechanical theory without observers or collapse which                     
nevertheless returns the correct probabilities for measurement outcomes of                 
quantum mechanics once its dynamical equations are analysed. According to                   
Bohmians it turns out after analysis that the pilot wave + particle description                         
returns all the standard predictions of quantum mechanics: the wave functions                     
naturally as a probability wave which returns the correct probabilities for                     
measurement outcomes in quantum experiments insofar as it always guides the                     
particle in line with the predictions of standard quantum mechanics (Goldstein                     
2013). So although a deterministic theory, the apparent stochasticity of                   
measurement outcomes arises on the Bohmian picture as a consequence of the                       
pilot wave / guiding equation framework (Goldstein 2013). 
 
Bohmians thus solve the measurement problem without “making the concept of                     
a measurement or observation part of the fundamental laws” (Ney 2013a, p. 30)                         
by identifying the values registered in definite measurement outcomes (e.g.                   
‘pointer states’ of measuring devices) with the ‘hidden variables’ (positions of                     
particles) postulated alongside the wave function (Goldstein 2013). So                 44
according to Bohmians, we never observe the superposition states entailed by                     
the standard linear quantum dynamics because, on their theory, entities “always                     
have determinate locations” (Ney 2013a, p. 30). Bohmians argue that the                     
appearance of collapse in measurement contexts reflects a change in the pilot                       
wave’s role in determining the motions of the particles: the amplitudes of the                         
wave which are no longer relevant to the particles’ evolution ​can be discarded                         
as extraneous to their description since the trajectories of the particles ultimately                       
44 Nevertheless Bohmian mechanics ​only gives the probabilities for measurement outcomes for                       
position states insofar as the only explicit observables in Bohmian mechanics are the positions of                             
pointers on measuring devices (Goldstein 2013). For example, according to Bohmian mechanics,                       
“spin operators [do not] correspond to genuine properties of … particles” (Goldstein 2013). 
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position them in a distinct configuration in support of the observed measurement                       
outcome (Bacciagaluppi 2012) rather than some other. In these contexts, the                     
symmetry between the amplitudes of the wave describing superpositions of                   
measurement outcomes is broken (Allori 2013, pp. 67­68), leading to apparent                     
collapse, “reflecting the sudden irrelevance … of some part of the wavefunction                       
in its influence on [the] variables” (Saunders 2010, pp. 4). Thus:  
 
“In the case of measurements, Bohm argued that the wave function                     
evolves into a superposition of components that are and remain                   
separated in the total configuration space of measured system and                   
apparatus, so that the total configuration is ‘trapped’ inside a single                     
component of the wave function, which will guide its further evolution, as                       
if the wave had collapsed (‘effective’ wave function).” (Bacciagaluppi                 
2012) 
 
That is, the extraneous amplitudes can simply be discarded and “once irrelevant                       
in this way [are] always irrelevant…. This explains the appearance of collapse”                       
(Saunders 2010, p. 4) insofar as it is easy to predict the observed measurement                           
outcome in the evolution of the physical system (Goldstein 2013). 
 
As for Schrodinger’s cat: similarly to how its states would be represented                       
according to classical mechanics, Schrodinger’s cat is always ​either alive ​or                     
dead according to Bohmians “since … getting a cat to come out either alive or                             
dead demands that the particles end up in one or another configuration”                       
(Maudlin 2010, p. 131) 
 
Insofar as in Bohmian mechanics the ‘primitive ontology’ is configurations of                     
“particles [which] always possess determinate locations in three­dimensional               
space” (Ney 2013a, p. 38), then “the … positions of all particles yield the familiar                             
picture of the (single) world we are aware of” (Vaidman 2014) and so it is                             
relatively easy to secure the connections between the manifest image of                     
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everyday experience and the scientific image of nature provided by this picture,                       
since: 
 
“Bohmian mechanics has no trouble accounting for our initial opinions                   
about a world of localized objects in a low­dimensional spacetime                   
because it postulates a world of localized microscopic objects in a                     































Although they entail drastically heterogeneous metaphysical pictures of reality,                 
Bohmian mechanics and pure wave mechanics are empirically equivalent, and                   
due to this quantum mechanics is arguably underdetermined by empirical                   
evidence. Because of this underdetermination, for naturalized ontology these                 





According to David Wallace, considerations from relativistic physics make                 
hidden variables theories such as Bohmian mechanics questionable: 
 
“For technical reasons (originating, for the most part, in relativistic                   
quantum physics) [hidden variables theories are] actually pretty               
questionable in modern physics.” (Wallace 2013, pp. 7­8) 
 
In particular, Bohmian mechanics is empirically adequate only for non­relativistic                   
phenomena (Callender 2009). For example, the velocity of a particle in an                       
entangled Bohmian system can be dependent on the states of                   
spatially­separated particles e.g. in the EPRB singlet state, and due to this                       
“non­local dynamics of Bohmian particle positions” (Vaidman 2014)—insofar as                 
the Bohmian guidance equation seems to presuppose ‘absolute simultaneity’                 
(Ney 2013a, p. 45)—Bohmian mechanics explicitly violates a fundamental                 
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The technical reasons that make hidden variables theories such as Bohmian                     
mechanics questionable in the context of modern physics mentioned by Wallace                     
are due to a theorem given by the physicist John Stewart Bell which places                           
severe constraints on the form any ‘hidden variables’ theory of quantum                     
mechanics can take. ‘Bell’s theorem’ in a nutshell is the proposition that no local                           
hidden variables physical theory will be in empirical agreement with all the                       
statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. In the years since Bell gave his                       
theorem it has been put to the test many times and these tests have supplied                             
physics and philosophy with a family of results that have come to be known as                             
‘Bell’s inequalities’ which more generally are a collective name for a family of                         
results derived from testing local hidden variables—i.e. theories which assume                   
hidden variables + locality—conceptual frameworks (Bub 2015).  
 
Utilizing the same sort of dialectical set­up as Bohm’s version of the EPR                         
thought experiment (EPRB), Bell argues that, given particular               
assumptions—such as ‘locality’ and ‘separability’—EPRB correlations obey a               
number of mathematical constraints known as ‘Bell’s inequalities’ (Bell 1964).                   
However quantum mechanics’s predictions violate these constraints and this                 
can be empirically demonstrated insofar as it is possible to set experiments up                         
to test whether the constraints hold when quantum mechanics predicts that they                       
45 “Bohmian mechanics and special relativity, a central principle of physics, are not compatible:                           
Bohmian mechanics is not Lorentz invariant. Nor can it easily be modified to accommodate Lorentz                             
invariance. Configurations, defined by the simultaneous positions of all particles, play too crucial a                           
role in its formulation, with the guiding equation defining an evolution on configuration space.”                           
(Goldstein 2013) 
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shouldn’t. When such experiments are run they invariably confirm that quantum                     
mechanics does indeed violate the EPRB constraints—and so confirm that                   
quantum mechanics is ‘inequal’ to ‘local realist’ (i.e. local hidden variables)                     
theories (Shimony 2009): 
 
“What Bell showed was that the statistical correlations between the                   
measurement outcomes of suitably chosen different quantities on               
[entangled] systems are inconsistent with an inequality derivable from                 
Einstein's separability and locality assumptions — in effect from the                   
assumption that the correlations have a common cause.” (Bub 2015) 
 
In order to derive his inequalities, Bell first formulates an example of a local                           
hidden variables framework. This framework consists of two pairs of systems,                     
where the individual systems that constitute each pair are each designated ‘1’                       
and ‘2’. Because Bell is considering a local hidden variables framework, each                       
pair is described by a single ‘complete state’ ‘m’ which specifies the totality of                           
the pair’s properties. The way the wave function of each entangled pair is                         
generated makes the complete state of the pair, after they separate,                     
independent of the properties of the individual systems which make up the pair.                         
Measurements on ‘1’ can take the value 1 or 2; likewise for measurements on                           
‘2’, and the probabilities for measurement outcomes on these systems always                     
add up to unity (Bub 2015). 
 
A key concept within Bell’s local hidden variables framework is ‘locality’, which                       
consists of the conjunction of two independence conditions: 
 
1) Remote outcome independence: given the total state ‘m’ of the pair, the                       
measurement outcome on ‘1’ predicts no information about measurement                 
outcomes on ‘2’, and vice­versa. 
 




This conjunction of independence conditions is known as ‘Bell’s locality’ (Bub                     
2015) and they roughly mirror the EPR local hidden variables assumptions.  
 
Next, Bell uses his ‘locality’ in order to derive ‘Bell’s inequality’, which as                         
mentioned previously is a mathematical constraint which bounds the possible                   
probabilities for measurement outcomes on ‘1’ and ‘2’ (Bub 2015).  
 
Finally, Bell demonstrates that quantum mechanics violates his inequality via                   
formulating a quantum system whose wave function’s probabilities for                 
measurement outcomes are empirically inconsistent the EPR assumptions (Bub                 
2015). This quantum system is made up of a pair of entangled photons ‘1’ and                             
‘2’ described by a single wave function where, before measurement, the state of                         
the two photon system can be expressed as a superposition of linear                       
polarization states, i.e., where 1 exists in a superposition of ‘linearly polarized in                         
x­direction’ + ‘linearly polarized in y­direction’, and likewise for 2 (Bub 2015).                       
Because they are entangled, the potential measurement outcomes on these                   
photons are correlated: if 1 is measured to be polarized in x­direction then 2 will                             
be measured to be in y­direction, and vice­versa (Bub 2015). In Bell’s                       
experimental set­up , the photon pairs are emitted from a light source,                     46
whereafter the states of the photons are measured by polarization analyzers.                     
The measurement outcome is ‘1’ when a photon’s polarization direction is in the                         
direction of the ‘transmission axis’ and thus emerges from the analyzer in the                         
‘ordinary ray’ whereas the measurement outcome is ‘­1’ when a photon’s                     
polarization direction is perpendicular to the transmission axis and thus emerges                     
from the analyzer in the ‘extraordinary ray’ (Bub 2015). Bell concludes that if you                           
46 Although Bell’s argument that quantum mechanics violate his inequality was originally developed                         
as a thought experiment, it has been experimentally tested and verified many times since its                             
formulation, most notably in 1982 by Aspect, Granger, and Roger, whose experimental set­up was                           
the first to utilize polarization analyzers with two exit channels and thus realize Bell’s conceptual                             
scheme as exactly formulated. 
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use the quantum mechanical wave function to calculate the probabilities that                     
photons 1 and 2 emerge from the polarization analyzers in the ordinary ray or                           
extraordinary ray you find that the probabilities for measurement outcomes                   
violate his inequality. The results of this experiment thus agree with quantum                       
mechanics and disagree with local hidden variables theories (Bub 2015). In                     
other words, the observed experimental statistics “agreeing with the quantum                   
mechanical predictions constitute a refutation of Bell's Inequality and hence of                     
the family of Local Realistic Theories.” (Bub 2015) 
 
Although Bell proved that quantum mechanics is in empirical conflict with the                       
EPR (local hidden variables) assumptions, the exact interpretation of the                   
violation of his inequalities is controversial due to the number of assumptions                       
involved. For example, according to Ghirardi “[i]n view of the experimental                     
violation of Bell's inequality, one has to give up either or both of [the EPR]                             
assumptions” (Ghirardi 2011)—i.e. give up locality, or separability, or both.                   
However it is not ​necessary to give up either of these assumptions on ​all                           
interpretations, as will be become clear. ​Nevertheless, there are two                   
main—conflicting—ways of interpreting Bell’s inequalities with regard to the                 
EPR assumptions.  
 
One way of interpreting Bell’s theorem is that it proves that measurements on                         
entangled physical systems suggest some form of ​nonlocal hidden variables                   
theory. For example, as an explicitly nonlocal hidden variables theory, there is                       
‘spooky action at a distance’ built into the very structure of Bohmian mechanics                         
insofar as the pilot wave changes instantaneously and nonlocally when                   
measurements are performed on elements in entangled systems: 
 
“[W]hen Bohm derives the statistical predictions of a Quantum                 
Mechanically entangled system whose constituents are well separated,               
the outcome of a measurement made on one constituent depends upon                     
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the action of the “guiding wave” upon constituents that are far off, which                         
in general will depend on the measurement arrangement on that side.”                     
(Shimony 2009) 
 
Indeed, the development of Bohmian mechanics “inspired Bell to take seriously                     
the hidden variables interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, and the nonlocality                   
of this model suggested his theorem.” (Shimony 2009) Proponents of Bohmian                     
mechanics are thus prepared to sacrifice a principle central to modern                     
physics—locality—in order to secure that quantum systems have definite                 
realities. The interpretation of the observed violations of Bell’s inequalities that                     
Bohmians are prepared to accept is thus that they proves that entangled                       
correlations in physical systems entail nonlocality: 
 
“It used to be widely believed that the pilot­wave theory of … Bohm …                           
had been ruled out by experiments demonstrating violations of Bell’s                   
inequality. Such misunderstandings have largely been overcome, and in                 
recent times the theory has come to be widely accepted by physicists as                         
an alternative (and explicitly non­local) formulation of quantum theory.”                 
(Valentini 2010, p. 477) 
 
On the other hand, some argue that this explicit invocation of nonlocality a sign                           
that the unnecessary extra physics is on the wrong track, insofar as this extra                           
physics makes Bohmian mechanics incompatible with Special Relativity;               
besides such an implication goes against EPR’s original motivation for                   
postulating hidden variables in the first place (i.e. in order to ‘fix’ what they saw                             
as quantum mechanics’s apparent incompatibility with Special Relativity): 
 
“[W]hen Bell’s predictions were confirmed, this established that EPR’s                 




The objection goes like this: Bell’s theorem ensures that hidden variables                     
theories such as Bohmian mechanics must necessarily be nonlocal due to                     
violating Lorentz­invariance: 
 
“In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to                       
determine the results of individual measurements, without changing the                 
statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of                     
one measuring device can influence the reading of another instrument,                   
however remote. Moreover, the signal involved must propagate               
instantaneously, so that a theory could not be Lorentz invariant.” (Bell                     
1984) 
 
Thus Bohmian mechanics conflicts not just in spirit but in principle with Special                         
Relativity, and thus quantum mechanics’s relativistic extensions, such as                 
quantum field theory, all the way up to the Standard Model, etc. The explicit                           
nonlocality built into Bohmian mechanics which makes it incompatible with                   
Special Relativity thus means that it lacks explanatory power, insofar as it                       
cannot explain the whole gamut of quantum phenomena. So, although Bohmian                     
mechanics arguably does explain the emergence of the manifest image in a                       
limited sense, ​it nevertheless should be noted that the theory of Special                       
Relativity is also a very well­confirmed aspect of the empirical world (insofar as                         
it has been experimentally tested to hell and back, and as far as we know hasn’t                               
made any predictions in conflict with experience), and insofar as Bohmian                     
mechanics can’t explain such relativistic phenomena, it lacks the theoretical                   
virtue of ‘explanatory power’: 
 
“Bohmian mechanics does not account for phenomena such as particle                   
creation and annihilation characteristic of quantum field theory. This is                   
not an objection to Bohmian mechanics but merely a recognition that                     
quantum field theory explains a great deal more than does nonrelativistic                     




Thus another way of interpreting the ramifications of Bell’s argument is that                       
since any hidden variables theory must be explicitly nonlocal insofar as                     
observed violations of Bell’s inequalities means that the values of any hidden                       
variables (what EPR refer to as a physical system’s ‘elements of reality’) cannot                         
be locally determined, then this makes it less likely that the wave function                         
merely provides incomplete knowledge about some definite, underlying reality,                 
and more likely that the standard, unitary quantum formalism is actually correct                       
instead. This is the interpretation Everettians are prepared to accept insofar as                       47
pure wave mechanics doesn’t violate Lorentz invariance and is thus compatible                     
with relativistic extensions of quantum mechanics, and so on. Pure wave                     48
mechanics is thus a good deal more explanatorily powerful than theories of                       





The idea of parsimony as a theoretical virtue is often cashed out in terms of the                               
principle of ‘Occam’s razor’, i.e. the principle that ‘plurality should not be posited                         
without necessity’ . In practice what Occam’s razor entails is that, when you are                         49
faced with a choice between multiple explanations for some phenomenon, then                     
47 A result related to Bell’s theorem: “The ​Kochen­Specker Theorem … [shows] that any                           
hidden­variables formulation of quantum mechanics must be contextual. It must violate the                       
noncontextuality assumption “that measurement of an observable must yield the same value                       
independently of what other measurements may be made simultaneously” (Bell 1987, p. 9). To                           
many physicists and philosophers of science contextuality seems too great a price to pay for the                               
rather modest benefits — largely psychological, so they would say — that hidden variables                           
provide.” (Goldstein 2013) 
48 “The MWI allows for a local explanation of our Universe. The most celebrated example of                               
nonlocality given by Bell 1964 in the context of the Einstein­Podolsky­Rosen argument cannot get                           
off the ground in the framework of the MWI because it requires a predetermined single outcome of                                 
a quantum experiment, see discussion in Bacciagaluppi 2002. There is no action at a distance in                               




the simplest explanation (i.e. the one which posits the fewest entities) is the one                           
you should pick. Put more quantitatively: according to probability theory                   
measures (e.g. Kolmogorov complexity, or Minimum Message Length), if a                   
theory is less parsimonious, then it is less likely to be true insofar as—to put it                               
very simply—the conjunction of x and y is less likely to exist than just x. 
 
A common criticism of pure wave mechanics follows from the supposition that,                       
although in practice an observer will never experience the other branches of the                         
wave function, they should nevertheless be considered “operationally real”                 
(Everett 1956, p. 150) insofar as quantum interference requires always treating                     
the other terms in a superposition as having observational consequences, i.e.,                     
because the existence of these other branches is necessitated by the linear                       
dynamics in order to explain interference effects (Barrett 2014). Because                   
decoherence couples each localized component of macroscopic objects in                 
superposition states to different states of the environment, a consequence of                     
this is that each possible degree of freedom of a physical system can be                           
coupled to the environment, ultimately leading to entangled superposition states                   
of many, many, many distinct terms (Bacciagaluppi 2012). This means that the                       
wave function of the entire universe is composed of an extremely large                       
macroscopic superposition of branches and represents an ‘ontological               
multiplicity’ (Wallace 2013, p. 8) of ‘worlds’.  
 
Critics use these facts to argue that pure wave mechanics is an egregiously                         
unparsimonious theory. However these ‘many worlds’ are not additional posits                   
on this theory; nothing is added to the unitary ontology of the wave function                           
evolving solely according to the linear dynamics; you actually have to​modify the                         
unitary theory in order to ​get rid of them (via adding some arbitrary collapse                           




“It seems that the majority of the opponents of the MWI reject it because,                           
for them, introducing a very large number of worlds that we do not see is                             
an extreme violation of Ockham's principle: “Entities are not to be                     
multiplied beyond necessity”. However, in judging physical theories one                 
could reasonably argue that one should not multiply physical laws                   
beyond necessity either (such a version of Ockham's Razor has been                     
applied in the past), and in this respect the MWI is the most economical                           
theory. Indeed, it has all the laws of the standard quantum theory, but                         
without the collapse postulate, which is the most problematic of the                     
physical laws. The MWI is also more economic than Bohmian mechanics,                     
which has in addition the ontology of the particle trajectories and the laws                         
which give their evolution.” (Vaidman 2014) 
 
Regarding Vaidman’s last point: insofar as Bohmian mechanics is committed to                     
“a dual ontology: the configuration q(t) together with the pilot wave [q,t]”                      Ψ  
(Valentini 2010, p. 483), it is arguably less parsimonious than pure wave                       
mechanics which is wave function monism, and thus less likely to be a true                           
description of reality. A related objection is that, because hidden variables                     
theories such as Bohmian mechanics modify the quantum ontology via                   
postulating additional parameters alongside the standard quantum ontology and                 
dynamics, some have criticised such approaches “on the basis that, being                     
empirically indistinguishable from quantum mechanics, such [approaches are]               
an example of ‘bad science’ or of ‘a degenerate research program’.” (Ghirardi                       
2011)  50
 
Ultimately, it is arguably the job of science to develop the simplest, most                         
powerful theory that fits all the data: to that end, you don’t tabulate the                           
ontological extravagance of a theory which explains a given set of data by                         
counting the overall number of entities (e.g. ‘worlds’); you tabulate it by counting                         
50 See also Brown and Wallace’s objection to Bohmian mechanics which is that such a view differs                                 
from Many­Worlds only insofar as it posits one extra entity—the so­called ‘world particle’, and thus                             
may be considered a sort of ‘Many­Worlds in denial’ (Ney 2013a, p. 43). 
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the number of distinct equations, and pure wave mechanics requires the fewest                       
number of equations to explain the whole range of quantum mechanical                     
phenomena. Evaluated along these lines, i.e. along the lines of objective criteria                       
for theory choice in cases of underdetermination such as parsimony and                     
explanatory power, pure wave mechanics is clearly the most virtuous theory in a                         
physical sense, insofar as it possesses the most explanatory power among                     
quantum interpretations while at the same time depending on the fewest                     
theoretical presuppositions i.e. ‘baggage’ (Tegmark 2008) required to explain                 
quantum phenomena. That is, pure wave mechanics gives you the most ‘bang                       
for your buck’ insofar as it postulates just the minimal physical structure                       
necessary to in order to explain all the experimental outcomes that are                       
inexplicable classically e.g. interference patterns in double­slit experiments,               
quantum entanglement, and so on. 
 
Yet, as mentioned previously, pure wave mechanics also entails a potentially                     
infinite number of absurdities insofar as, on this view, the evolution of the wave                           
function according to the unbroken Schrodinger dynamics leads to the                   
actualization of every possible measurement outcome. Perhaps this should lead                   
us to consider the negation of a proposition we assumed was true at the                           
beginning of essay, namely wave function realism. Either that or arbitrarily pick                       
a clearly deficient realistic theory in the form of Bohmian mechanics. So let us                           











Richard Feynman’s ‘path integral’ formulation of quantum mechanics is an                   
example of an anti­realist interpretation of quantum mechanics which                 
nevertheless makes ​instrumental ​use of the wave function insofar as it explicitly                       
makes use of all its amplitudes in its calculations for measurement outcomes in                         
quantum experiments. For example in the context of the double­slit experiment,                     
for Feynman’s path integral formulation ​every possible amplitude ​of the photon                     
which—theoretically, at least—describes every possible path it can take through                   
the slits on its way to the photographic plate is used to calculate the final                             
outcome i.e. the observed interference distribution. Feynman, regarding such                 
interference effects, suggests the following: 
 
“How does it really work? What machinery is actually producing this                     
thing? Nobody knows any machinery. Nobody can give you a deeper                     
explanation of this phenomenon than I have given; that is, a ​description                       
of it.” (Feynman 1967, p. 145, emphasis added) 
 
More generally, anti­realist or instrumentalist approaches to quantum               
mechanics, such as ‘epistemic’ interpretations—where, for example, the               
amplitudes of the wave function merely encode the (lack of) knowledge you                       
have about a physical system, such as the probabilites that you will find it in a                               
particular state when you measure it—all share one crucial feature: according to                       
such interpretations, the wave function does not represent the objective reality                     
of physical systems. If the wave function does not represent the reality of                         
physical systems, then this means that the absurdities implied by pure wave                       
mechanics are nothing more than mere fictions, errors which arise only if one                         
makes the mistake of taking the wave function to be more than simply an                           
instrument to calculate the probabilities for measurement outcomes in quantum                   
experiments. Such a stance about quantum mechanics is eloquently summed                   
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up in the following phrase, coined by the physicist David Mermin: “Shut up and                           
calculate!” (Mermin 1989, p. 9) 
 
Although some have argued that “[q]uantum state probabilities do not allow for                       
an ignorance interpretation [insofar as] they are ontic probabilities” (Lyre 2010,                     
p. 1432), prima facie it seems unlikely whether one could prove either way                         
whether the wave function represents the reality of physical systems or merely                       
(lack of) knowledge about them. However recently an experiment was set up to                         
test claims made by realists such as the above, the results of which seemingly                           
rule out a broad class of these instrumental interpretations of quantum                     
mechanics. In a paper entitled ‘Measurements on the reality of the                     
wavefunction’, the physicists Martin Ringbauer et. al. argue that they have                     
experimentally demonstrated a phenomenon which proves (or at least suggests)                   
the following proposition about the ontological status of the wave function:  
 
“[N]o knowledge interpretation can fully explain the indistinguishability of                 
non­orthogonal quantum states in three and four dimensions. Assuming                 
that some underlying reality exists, our results strengthen the view that                     
the entire wavefunction should be real.” (Ringbauer et. al. 2015, abstract) 
 
Ringbauer et. al.’s experiment concerns measurements on photons which are                   
prepared in superpositions of non­orthogonal vertical and diagonal polarization                 51
states. They argue that if the photons’ polarization states could not determined                       
exactly then that would mean that they really are in superpositions of vertical                         
and diagonal polarization states, rather than being ‘actually’ in some definite                     
(although unknown) states. This would thus suggest that the photons’ wave                     
functions correspond to their reality. Conversely, if the photons’ polarization                   
states could be exactly determined, then this would suggest that they always                       
have definite polarisation states and therefore that their wave functions                   
51 i.e. where the states are not opposites of eachother. 
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represent mere lack of knowledge about some definite (although unknown)                   
underlying states, and thus do not represent the reality of the photons. Once the                           
experiments were performed Ringbauer et. al. found that they could not glean                       
enough information to exactly determine the polarization states of the photons                     
which suggested that they were superpositions rather than definite states after                     
all. Ringbauer et. al. conclude that this shows that the wave function is in direct                             
correspondence with the objective reality of quantum systems rather than                   
representing mere (lack of) knowledge about them, as anti­realist, instrumental,                   
or epistemic interpretations of the wave function would have it (Ringbauer et. al.                         
2015).  
 
Seemingly, our way out of the present quandary is blocked: if the wave function                           
cannot be regarded as being merely epistemic, i.e. as representing our                     
knowledge about quantum systems rather than anything ontological or                 
objective, then this means that we are stuck with a physical theory which is                           
essentially absurd—remember pure wave mechanics’s elephant in the room!                 
















In this essay I have argued that assuming that the best interpretation of our best                             
physical theory represents reality entails a multitude of absurdities. In a shallow                       
way, this has the dialectical structure of something like a reductio ad absurdum                         
argument: assuming wave function realism allows you to derive an absurdity.                     
However I have also shown that we are prevented from taking this assumption’s                         
negation—wave function anti­realism—by a convincing argument in the recent                 
physics literature. 
 
In the introduction to this essay, I mentioned that the guiding question of                         
naturalized ontology is:  
 
What does quantum mechanics (as our best physical theory) say about                     
the nature of reality in the most general sense?  
 
In other words, the investigation guiding the course of this essay has been to                           
figure out what the most general thing one can say about the nature of the                             
reality according to quantum mechanics is. After careful consideration, the                   
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